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Abstract 
Author: Karena S. Yu 
Title:  From Print to Screen: 
Asian American Romantic Comedies and Sociopolitical Influences 
 
Supervisor: Madhavi Mallapragada, Ph.D. 
 
In this thesis, I examine how sociopolitical contexts and production cultures have affected 
how original Asian American narrative texts have been adapted into mainstream romantic 
comedies. I begin by defining several terms used throughout my thesis: race, ethnicity, Asian 
American, and humor/comedy. Then, I give a history of Asian American media portrayals, as 
these earlier images have profoundly affected the ways in which Asian Americans are seen in 
media today. Finally, I compare the adaptation of humor in two case studies, Flower Drum Song 
(1961) which was created by Rodgers and Hammerstein, and Crazy Rich Asians (2018) which was 
directed by Jon M. Chu. From this analysis, I argue that both seek to undercut the perpetual 
foreigner myth, but the difference in sociocultural incentives and control of production have 
resulted in more nuanced portrayals of some Asian Americans in the latter case. However, its 
tendency to push towards the mainstream has limited its ability to challenge stereotyped 
representations, and it continues to privilege an Americentric perspective.  
 
 3 
 
Acknowledgements 
I owe this thesis to the support and love of many people. To Dr. Mallapragada, thank you 
for helping me shape my topic through both your class and our meetings. I am endlessly grateful 
for your time, expertise, and encouragement during these past two semesters. Your expansive 
and nuanced take on Asian American media cultures has forever shaped the way I interpret 
media and culture (with a “little c”). To Dr. Lai, thank you also for your time and guidance 
throughout this process. I have enjoyed sharing in the humor from literature and film products 
with you, and I am excited to tackle the list of recommended reading and viewing that I have 
assembled from our discussions. Thank you, too, to Dr. Madeline Hsu, who allowed me to audit 
her “Introduction to Asian American History” class, which has greatly informed the contents of 
this thesis. To all my professors in college: thank you for challenging me to think about the world 
in new ways. Under your tutelage, I have grown as both a student and a person. To my friends—
Bradley, Vandita, Nikhi, Olivia, Roberto, and many others—thank you for your support in my final 
year of college. The food, breaks, and laughs you provided are greatly appreciated. Most 
importantly, thank you to my mom and dad for always sharing your love and wisdom with me. I 
owe my everything to you.  
 
 4 
 
Table of Contents 
Introduction ................................................................................................................................ 5 
Chapter 1: Foundations and Questions ...................................................................................... 8 
1. Race and Ethnicity ............................................................................................................... 8 
2. Forming Asian America ..................................................................................................... 14 
3. Comedy, Humor, and Racial or Ethnic Marginality ........................................................... 18 
4. Comedy, Commercial Media Industries, and Race ........................................................... 26 
5. Thesis Questions ............................................................................................................... 28 
Chapter 2: Asian American Histories and Media Representations .......................................... 30 
1. Asian American Histories as United States History .......................................................... 31 
2. Chinese Exclusion Act and Orientalism ............................................................................. 35 
3. Anti-miscegenation and “Yellow Face” ............................................................................. 38 
4. Post-World War II and Constructing Asian Femininity ..................................................... 41 
5. The Cold War and the Model Minority Myth ................................................................... 45 
Chapter 3: Flower Drum Song and Crazy Rich Asians ............................................................... 50 
1. Flower Drum Song ............................................................................................................. 51 
2. Crazy Rich Asians ............................................................................................................... 62 
3. Mainstream Romantic Comedy Conventions ................................................................... 80 
4. Accents and Languages ..................................................................................................... 85 
5. Conclusion ....................................................................................................................... 104 
References .............................................................................................................................. 107 
Biography ................................................................................................................................ 117 
 
 
 5 
 
Introduction 
Since the start of the 20th century, Asian and Asian American characters have appeared in 
United States media. These depictions have reflected national struggles, both internal and 
external, as the United States sought to define itself and what it means to be American within 
global contexts. The control of these images has primarily rested in the hands of white directors, 
writers, and even actors/actresses, and the resulting representations have been dominated by 
limited, recycled stereotypes. However, in the late 20th-century, Asian American filmmakers took 
control of their own images through independent film. Today, the foundations they laid are being 
built upon; the influx of Asian American-led and created film and television in the last 5 years 
makes Crazy Rich Asians (2018) appear to be a culminating point in the battle for Asian American 
representation. Is it a watershed moment though, bringing Asian American characters and 
storylines out of the margins and into popular consciousness?  
In this thesis, I ask how sociopolitical contexts and production cultures have affected the 
way original Asian American narrative texts have been translated to film, specifically romantic 
comedies. To answer this question, I examine the screen adaptations of fictional works by writers 
of Chinese-descent, focusing on how the humor within the original texts has been maintained or 
altered. I am specifically using humor because it can be wielded to both connect/humanize 
individuals and further marginalize them. The humor-related choices that are made can therefore 
reveal in-group (the audience the humor was intended to reach) and out-group decisions, which 
are tied to social and political motivators. After defining my terms, the first section of my thesis 
lays out the mechanics of humor which I use to analyze the chosen texts and identifies ways in 
which humor overlaps with marginality and ethnicity. In this overview, I rely primarily on Dolf 
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Zillmann’s summary of theories of humor, Jerry Farber’s theoretical framework of humor, and 
Nick Marx and Matt Sienkiewicz’s anthology, The Comedy Studies Reader. 
Asian American images in media constantly interact with historical representations, which 
influence and are influenced by sociopolitical motivations of the times. Therefore, to 
contextualize my analysis, I introduce Asian American histories and media representations in the 
second section of my thesis. To do so, I combine Shelley Sang-Hee Lee’s history of Asian America 
with culture and media studies by other scholars. The period covered includes the late 1800s 
through the Cold War, during which time the dominant media stereotypes included gendered 
narratives of Orientalism, Yellow Peril, and the Model Minority Myth.  
In the final section of my thesis, I analyze two works written by Asian American authors 
and their adaptations into romantic comedy films. The first is The Flower Drum Song (1957) by C. 
Y. Lee, adapted into a 1958 musical and a 1961 film. The second is Crazy Rich Asians (2013) by 
Kevin Kwan, adapted into a 2018 film. These texts have been selected because there are 
moments of humor within both versions of the texts and the romantic comedy adaptations 
feature Asian American casts. In addition, I focus on writers of Chinese-descent to further narrow 
the scope of the project, since the United States’ treatment of Asian and Asian American groups 
becomes increasingly non-uniform between ethnic groups.  
I am specifically using adaptations because there is no single “Asian American experience,” 
and deciding what aspects of a media text are individuated versus stereotyped is challenging 
without this nonexistent standard. The written works are therefore used as a baseline for 
“individual experience,” and the differential between the original and the media text provides an 
understanding of the notions of “Asian Americanness” that are at play in media institutions. 
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These distinctions are not to say that the authors do not participate in stereotyping as well, but 
the differences between the media and written text reveal the effects of social, political, and 
economic influences within broader production institutions. Through this process, I identify the 
notions of “Asian Americanness” that the creators interact with, the effects of being marginalized 
by sociopolitical structures, and, in the case of Crazy Rich Asians, what happens when 
marginalized creators take control. For each adaptation, I also identify the production processes, 
sociocultural contexts, and the reception of these works. 
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Chapter 1: Foundations and Questions 
Race, ethnicity, Asian American, comedy, humor: these terms are used widely in everyday 
conversations but have a variety of meanings and connotations. Therefore, the first four sections 
of this chapter specify how these terms will be used in the context of this thesis. The first section 
defines and contextualizes the terms “race” and “ethnicity.” These words have precise meanings 
within the current United States census, but they also have broader sociopolitical implications 
related to the nation’s development and current state. The second section of this chapter gives 
an overview of how the identifier of “Asian American” originally emerged as a radical term that 
helped unify various communities in the United States in their political pursuits for civil inclusion 
and dignities. However, this now-institutionalized umbrella term and the pan-Asian American 
unification it implies do not necessarily reflect how the individuals lumped in it identify (both at 
the time of the term’s inception and now), and they hide the diversity within Asian American 
communities and individuals. Next, the third and fourth sections of this chapter deal with comedy 
and humor. The third section lays out the definitions of comedy and humor, theories about 
humor mechanics, a framework with which humor can be studied, and the intersection of humor 
with race and ethnicity. The fourth section then brings in commercial media industries and how 
profit motivations affect the comedic genre. Once these terms are defined, the fifth and final 
section of this chapter introduces the questions and methods of this thesis.   
1. Race and Ethnicity 
Race and ethnicity, two terms often used interchangeably, are recognized by the United 
States (U.S.) National Institutes of Health (NIH) as socio-political categories which are not 
biological or anthropological in nature (Schiebinger et al. 2018). Research studies including these 
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classifications therefore depend on an individual’s self-identification (Schiebinger et al. 2018). As 
of 2017, the U.S. Census Bureau recognizes five racial categories based on “regions of origin” 
(Table 1, below), in addition to a category for “other race” (United States Census Bureau 2017). 
Starting from the 2000 census, respondents can select multiple races (United States Census 
Bureau 2017; Gibson and Jung 2002, 2). The only ethnicities measured by the census are 
“Hispanic or Latino” or “Not Hispanic or Latino” (United States Census Bureau 2017).  
Some complications with race and ethnicity, as with any categorical grouping of human 
beings, become immediately apparent. First, defining group boundaries tends to falsely 
homogenize those within the group, overlooking distinctions between subpopulations and 
individuals (Schiebinger et al. 2018). Second, these categorical boundaries are defied by the 
existence of multiracial and multiethnic individuals (Schiebinger et al. 2018). Third, these limited 
categories can fail to reflect an individual’s self-identification, as seen by the increase in Hispanic 
or Latinx census respondents who choose “other race”1 on the census (Gibson and Jung 2002, 6).   
Table 1: Regions of Origin for Race Categories (United States Census Bureau 2017) 
 
                                                     
1 In 1970, census respondents who identified as Mexican, Cuban, or Puerto Rican were reclassified as 
“white” if they chose “other race.” In 1980, this reclassification practice was abandoned, and “other race” 
was accepted (Gibson and Jung 2002, 6). 
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Despite the arbitrary criteria of racial categorization, its continued influence on social 
structures stems from its origin as a tool of conquest, oppression, and slavery throughout history 
(Schiebinger et al. 2018). Initially conceived of as a biological quality, race was used to support 
the superiority of white groups while justifying the suppression of non-white groups (more on 
the development of U.S. racial categories in Chapter 2) (Schiebinger et al. 2018; Smedley and 
Smedley 2005, 19; Rhodes 1993, 185–86). Geneticists now widely consider race to be 
nonpredictive of genetic differences, yet ideas of biological racial superiority continue to linger, 
as evidenced by scientific studies in the 1990s and 2000s that, for example, tried to prove that 
whites and blacks have different brain structures and IQs (Schiebinger et al. 2018; Smedley and 
Smedley 2005, 16, 19). 
Ethnicity was developed as a category not based on biology, but culture, which is 
considered by anthropologists to be an external, learned quality (Smedley and Smedley 2005, 17). 
The term “ethnicity” tends to denote a group of people who share common ancestry (of kinship, 
migration, or colonization) and/or culture (language, religion, customs, beliefs) (Schiebinger et al. 
2018). Key to the formation of an ethnic group is a shared consciousness of belonging within that 
group (J. Lowe 1986, 440). The boundaries of ethnic groups are always being renegotiated, as 
they depend on both self-designation from within and interactions with outside groups (J. Lowe 
1986, 440).  
Like racial differences, ethnic differences have been used during times of interethnic 
conflict (often between neighboring groups with physical similarities) to demonize the enemy 
group (Smedley and Smedley 2005, 18). The difference between racism and ethnocentric conflict 
in U.S. history was that ethnic minorities were expected to assimilate, while racial minorities 
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experienced enforced separation (Smedley and Smedley 2005, 19). Ethnicity was therefore used 
in U.S. ethnic assimilation narratives from the 1940s onwards to promise a society open to all 
participants while attempting to sweep histories of racial conflict under the rug (more on ethnic 
assimilation in Chapter 2) (R. G. Lee 1999). 
However, race continues to have pervasive influence on U.S. social structures and 
ideologies, so race will be referred to more often than ethnicity in this thesis. Certain 
characteristics pertaining to race have developed in U.S. society, summarized from Audrey and 
Brian D. Smedley’s 2005 publication, “Race as Biology is Fiction, Racism as a Social Problem is 
Real” (2005) (Smedley and Smedley 2005, 20):  
Social Characteristics of Race in North America 
1) Races are hierarchically ranked because racial systems are fundamentally unequal. 
2) Racial groups are perceived as biologically discrete and exclusive, such that physical 
characteristics become markers of race2. 
3) Certain cultural behaviors are assumed to be inherited based on race.  
4) Following from 2 and 3, physical features and behaviors are innate and inherited.  
5) Therefore, differences between races are large and permanent, justifying segregation 
and anti-miscegenation.  
6) Legal and social systems stipulate racial classifications. 
 
As noted previously, the assumptions included above are not scientifically valid (though 
they have unfortunately shaped scientific research), but the myth of their existence continues to 
fundamentally contribute to U.S. ideologies. For example, a Pew Research Center report written 
in 2012, titled The Rise of Asian Americans, compares racial groups in both its report and survey 
questions, using rhetoric that reinforces the notion of a racial hierarchy:   
“Asian Americans are the highest-income, best-educated, and fastest-growing 
racial group in the United States” (Cohn et al. 2012, 1).  
                                                     
2 One important caveat is that, despite the use of physical traits as markers for race, the act of racializing 
individuals does not require specific physical traits to be present (Smedley and Smedley 2005, 22). 
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“About four-in-ten Asian Americans (43%) say Asian Americans are more 
successful than other racial and ethnic minorities in the U.S.” (Cohn et al. 2012, 16, 
85). 
 
That a racial comparison is made in the first quote is unsurprising, and even expected, 
within a nation in which policy makers rely on race and ethnicity data to aim for equality in 
education, employment, and health care access (United States Census Bureau 2017). The second 
quote is stronger evidence of item 1, as it indicates that Pew researchers have asked survey 
respondents to actively compare themselves to other racial groups using hierarchical wording3.  
The issue of legally codified and enforced racial identities in item 6, though no longer in 
place, has also had a heavy influence on the current state of U.S. society. For example, the 
question of reparations and reconciliations for transatlantic slavery, a race-based and legally 
supported institution in the history of the U.S., continues to be discussed in the 2020 presidential 
campaigns (Stampler 2019). In addition, though race does not predict genetic differences, it does 
predict access or barriers to resources and societal inclusion (Smedley and Smedley 2005, 22, 23). 
Thus, though intentional discrimination has been outlawed, its history of legal permittance has 
resulted in institutional discrimination4 and inequalities in areas such as home mortgage lending, 
                                                     
3 Interestingly, out of the measured racial and ethnic groups, this question was only included in surveys 
of Asian and Hispanic or Latinx respondents (at least as far as I have been able to uncover) (Cohn et al. 
2012, 87). The question, “On the whole, do you think Asian Americans/Hispanics/Latinos have been more 
successful than other racial and ethnic minority groups in the U.S., less successful, or about equally 
successful?” was asked in the “2012 National Survey of Latinos” and the “2012 Asian-American Survey” 
(Cohn et al. 2012, 221, 247, 2013, 107, 120). Perhaps this question was designed for the 2013 Pew 
Research Center report, Second-Generation Americans (written by nearly the same group of authors as 
the 2012 report on Asian Americans), which focused on Hispanic Americans and Asian Americans because 
these two groups make up the majority of U.S. first and second generation immigrants (Cohn et al. 2013, 
7). 
4  Institutional discrimination is defined by Smedley and Smedley as “the uneven access by group 
membership to resources, status, and power that stems from facially neutral policies and practices of 
organizations and institutions” (Smedley and Smedley 2005, 22) 
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residential segregation, employment and housing practices, and health care (Smedley and 
Smedley 2005, 22).    
Because U.S. institutions like the NIH and Census Bureau now recognize that race, 
unmoored from biology, is a social construct, another characteristic fundamental to the current 
racial ideology of the United States becomes apparent. As evidenced by Table 1, current 
institutionalized race classification depends almost exclusively on self-identified “regions of 
origin.” Related is the common rhetoric that the U.S. is “a nation of immigrants”—a phrase 
popularized by J. F. Kennedy’s book with the same title—which reminds nationals who do not 
identify with the “American Indian or Alaska Native” race category that they have extraterritorial 
“origins” (Jordan 2018). This emphasis on origins is not just at the state-level: the popularity of 
genetic ancestry testing also verify that individuals, unsurprisingly, have an interest in their own 
origins (Bessone 2017, 616). Furthermore, an individual’s origin-based identification can 
supersede their race-based identification. First-generation immigrants especially tend to identify 
based on their country of origin instead of using pan-racial or pan-ethnic terms5 (Cohn et al. 2013, 
47–48). This national and independent focus on “origins,” no matter if they are recent or distant, 
thus tie notions of race to individual histories.  
                                                     
5 The 2013 Pew Research Center report, Second-Generation Americans, summarizes responses to a survey 
question which asked whether the respondents described themselves most often using “[Country of 
Origin],” a pan-racial/pan-ethnic term (“Latino/Hispanic” or “Asian” or “Asian American”), or “American” 
(Cohn et al. 2013, 120). First-generation Hispanic/Latinx and Asian American respondents overwhelmingly 
identified by their country of origin (61% for Hispanic/Latinx and 69% for Asian). These numbers dropped 
for second-generation Americans (38% for Hispanic/Latinx and 45% for Asian), replaced with an increase 
in respondents who identified as “American” (Cohn et al. 2013, 47–48). “First-generation” refers to people 
born outside of the U.S. and U.S. territories to non-U.S. citizen parents (Cohn et al. 2013, 4). “Second-
generation” refers to people born in the U.S. or U.S. territories to at least one “first-generation” parent 
(Cohn et al. 2013, 4). The report does not discuss other racial/ethnic group responses to this question (see 
footnote 3). 
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This more recently institutionalized “regions of origin” and self-identification-focused 
concept of race therefore places it closer to ethnicity. However, completely embracing this 
ideology of race in isolation would be a mistake. Though seemingly well-intentioned in its 
correction of the previous biological basis of race, this definition is misleading. Similar to how 
ethnicity theory was used to suppress racial tensions, this sterilized definition of race diverts 
attention away from the social and economic stratification of the U.S. (Nguyen 1998, 629). “Race 
is not a matter of individual choice, but an enduring feature of social differentiation encouraged 
by the law and by a stratified economy,” author Viet Thanh Nguyen argues in his review of Lisa 
Lowe’s book, Immigrant Acts: On Asian American Cultural Politics (Nguyen 1998, 630). Therefore, 
though this thesis will be relying on the contemporary “regions of origin” definition of “race” for 
clarity and consistency with other scholarly works, the term still carries the weight of its history 
in and effect on U.S. society, its previously listed social characteristics, and the reality that race is 
frequently imposed on individuals regardless of their self-identification.  
2. Forming Asian America 
 The term “Asian American” was coined during the 1960s, a period shaped by grassroots 
movements amongst minority groups (including African Americans, Latinxs, women, and 
homosexuals), students, and anti-war activists (Nguyen 1998, 632; S. S.-H. Lee 2014, 291). At this 
time, the term signified a radical pan-Asian politicization and mobilization against racism, 
imperialism, and class oppression, driven by desires to dismantle their foreignization and assert 
their belonging in America6 (S. S.-H. Lee 2014, 291–92). These Asian American activists were 
                                                     
6 Earlier examples of Asian American activism exist, but it hadn’t previously been self-organized under the 
shared identification of “Asian American” (S. S.-H. Lee 2014, 292). 
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heavily influenced and inspired by black political activism, and Asian-black solidarities developed 
through their collaboration and mutual understandings (S. S.-H. Lee 2014, 292–94, 297).  
Asian American activism and consciousness emerged in several ways during the 1960s 
and 1970s. Some Asian American activists rejected stereotypes of passivity inherent in 
assimilation and “model minority” narratives (discussed further in Chapter 2), while others 
wanted justice for wrongs committed against their communities (S. S.-H. Lee 2014, 292). Asian 
American critiques against the Vietnam War centered around its racist and imperialist 
dimensions (compared to the critiques against violence offered by mainstream anti-war 
movements), and many Asian American anti-war activists saw in the peoples oppressed by 
colonialism abroad a reflection of their domestic position as racial minorities (S. S.-H. Lee 2014, 
294–96). In California, the Third World Liberation Front (TWLF) developed as a coalition 
organization that brought together black, Latinx, Asian American, and Native American student 
activists (S. S.-H. Lee 2014, 301). The organization began a strike on November 6, 1968 to demand 
the addition of ethnic studies to universities (which would teach the backgrounds and histories 
of minority groups, undistorted by mainstream academia), challenge institutional racism, and 
advocate for minority access to higher education (S. S.-H. Lee 2014, 303–4). As a consequence of 
their activism, the first School of Ethnic Studies was established in the U.S. (S. S.-H. Lee 2014, 
306).  
Other issues that Asian American activists rallied around included the Japanese American 
redress campaign and the anti-eviction movement at the International Hotel (S. S.-H. Lee 2014, 
306–12). Simultaneously, Asian Americans were recovering their histories and engaging in 
cultural production such as writing, making music, creating and performing in plays, and 
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generating art (visual, theatrical, and film) (S. S.-H. Lee 2014, 298–99). Filmmaker Renee Tajima-
Peña believes that the first stage of Asian American independent filmmaking that emerged during 
this period was a form of activism and thus reflected the political motivations of these 
communities (Tajima 1991, 14–16).   
This first Asian American movement was not immune to marginalizing its own minorities, 
though. Gender politics and women’s input were largely disregarded by the men of the 
movement, and as a result, women formed their own organizations (S. S.-H. Lee 2014, 300). 
Homosexuality, too, was ignored. Gay activists found themselves isolated by both the Asian 
American movement and the gay rights movement (S. S.-H. Lee 2014, 300). Therefore, they 
sought out and created their own groups at the intersection of these two communities (S. S.-H. 
Lee 2014, 300). At the same time (and after) this period of Asian American activism, legal changes 
in immigration law (starting in 1965) brought an influx of immigrants from Asia that substantially 
changed the demographics of Asian America (S. S.-H. Lee 2014, 317). Most of these immigrants 
came with families, and about one-third were educated and skilled professionals7 (S. S.-H. Lee 
2014, 318). The success of some of these immigrants dominated media representations, which 
exacerbated the model minority stereotype, and preexisting Asian American activist groups and 
communities experienced challenges in incorporating these more recent immigrants into their 
communities and movements (S. S.-H. Lee 2014, 312, 329, 336).   
                                                     
7 Entry to the U.S. privileges those who come from higher socioeconomic and educational backgrounds (S. 
S.-H. Lee 2014, 318–21, 330). However, there were also many Asian immigrants who were refugees, 
undocumented, or sponsored by families, and the Asian immigrant population remained 
socioeconomically diverse (S. S.-H. Lee 2014, 318, 321–22, 330). Thus, the Asian American population both 
increased in the number of upper class professionals and lower class working poor (S. S.-H. Lee 2014, 331). 
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During the 1980s and 1990s, the movement was reawakened. In 1982, two white men 
who blamed their unemployment on the Japanese, killed Vincent Chin (a Chinese American), 
bringing anti-Asian, racialized violence into public view (S. S.-H. Lee 2014, 338–39). These anti-
Japanese sentiments (driven by economic competition between the U.S. and Japan) were 
accompanied by the racialized scrutiny of Korean American and Chinese American individuals like 
Suzi Thompson and Wen-Ho Lee (driven by suspicions of Korean and Chinese influence on U.S. 
politics and national defense) (S. S.-H. Lee 2014, 340–42). Under these circumstances, which 
upended the myth of a “postracial America,” many Asian Americans were forced to recognize 
their continued racial vulnerability (S. S.-H. Lee 2014, 342). They unified to advocate for stronger 
legislation against hate crimes (S. S.-H. Lee 2014, 342). Tajima-Peña argues that both the Asian 
American movement and cinematography became more institutionalized during this period, the 
latter developing a more technical and market focus as it aimed towards mainstream appeal 
(Tajima 1991, 22–23).  
Asian America, however, is not one community with a single mindset. Some Filipino 
American activists have even advocated for the separation of “Filipino” from the “Asian” category 
in the census (S. S.-H. Lee 2014, 347). In addition, Viet Than Nguyen argues that the Asian 
American coalition has become more politically diverse and, in some factions, even contrary to 
its initial radical motivations in the ’60s (Nguyen 1998, 632). It now includes the Asian American 
neoconservative, who has reconciled racial self-identity with free-market economics, and the 
Asian American liberal, who uses political activism to strive towards the middle class and upward 
mobility (Nguyen 1998, 632–33). Both figures have accepted the exploitative structures of 
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capitalism and liberal representative democracy8, which Lisa Lowe has argued were the original 
incentives behind the 1960s radical dissent (Nguyen 1998, 632). Issues like affirmative action, too, 
continue to be divisive (discussed further in Chapter 2) (S. S.-H. Lee 2014, 342–43). 
For consistency with the “regions of origin” definition of “race” used in this thesis, when 
the term “Asian American” (and “[Country of Origin] American”) is used in this thesis, it refers to 
people who have either themselves immigrated from those areas or have an ancestor who has 
immigrated from those areas. However, this terminology comes with an important caveat that 
the individuals may not always identify with these terms themselves9 (see footnote 5), as well as 
the recognition that these labels, chosen because of their scholastic and governmental 
acceptance, also contribute to the racialization and false homogenization of these individuals. 
3. Comedy, Humor, and Racial or Ethnic Marginality 
Comedy, as media scholar Dolf Zillmann explains, is a form of drama that centers around 
conflict and resolution plots (Zillmann 2000, 35). However, it differs from the dramatic genre 
because it requires a “comic frame of mind”: the audience must relax empathetic restraints and 
serious mindsets in order to be receptive to the format’s lighthearted attitude towards its topics 
(Zillmann 2000, 39). The term “humor” is harder to capture because it is frequently used to mean 
several different things: a stimulus that elicits or is intended to elicit laughter or amusement (e.g., 
a joke), the act of creating that stimulus (e.g., telling a joke), the psychological state of 
                                                     
8 According to Lisa Lowe, capitalism enforces a hegemony by allowing dominant groups to prosper while 
generating labor exploitation, class divisions, forced migration, and cultural displacement of nondominant 
groups (Nguyen 1998, 628, 634). The liberal democracy promises rights, citizenship, and political 
representation but instead suppresses dissent while perpetuating exclusion (Nguyen 1998, 628, 631).  
9 This thesis attempts to use the same terms as those chosen by identified individuals, but often relies on 
descriptions from other parties.  
 19 
 
amusement (e.g., response to the joke), and a characteristic tendency to laugh or tell jokes (e.g. 
“sense of humor”) (Warren, Barsky, and Mcgraw 2018, 530). In this thesis, the first definition of 
humor is being used, which Warren et al. even relabel as “comedy” (Warren, Barsky, and Mcgraw 
2018, 530).  
Zillman argues that any such humorous expression, whatever its format and length, can 
be analyzed as a miniature comedic plot, since it must express some commentary on a set of 
circumstances within some kind of conflict-resolution framework (Zillmann 2000, 39–40). 
Therefore, though the term “humor” will generally be used to refer to a quality of situations and 
materials which may induce laughter and amusement, and “comedy” will generally refer to the 
genre that does the same, the words will also be used somewhat interchangeably in this thesis. 
Although there is no single theory which explains what makes for successful humor (funny, 
popular, or profitable), there are many theories of how audiences understand humor (discussed 
in this section), and how producers have used it to generate profit (discussed in the next section) 
(Marx and Sienkiewicz 2018, 1).  
The “superiority theory” of humor, credited to philosopher Thomas Hobbes, depends on 
the audiences’ judgement of the characters within the mini-plot (Zillmann 2000, 37, 40). For a 
drama to be enjoyed, well-liked characters who may begin as victims should benefit by the end, 
while disliked characters should experience misfortune (Zillmann 2000, 35–36). However, the 
latter situation tends to have more comedic value, and thus, disparagement of disliked characters, 
especially by the liked characters, becomes common in comedy (Zillmann 2000, 37). As Hobbes 
theorized, laughing at someone else’s misfortune places audience members above the victim of 
humiliation, which gives them feelings of superiority and strengthens their ego and self-
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confidence (Zillmann 2000, 40–41). Similar results emerge when seeing undeservedly successful 
characters fail, suggesting that it is not always a sense of superiority that evokes enjoyment, but 
perhaps a sense of justice and restored fairness (Zillmann 2000, 42).  
William McDougall clarifies that laughter at the misfortune of others is the release of 
empathetic distress; that is, assuming that humans naturally wish to empathize, when we dislike 
the victim and refuse to identify with them, our pent-up empathy at the situation is instead 
converted into laughter (Zillmann 2000, 41–42). Not all disparagement evokes laughter: if the 
recipient is not in a comic frame of mind or does in fact empathize or align with the object of 
derision, laughter fails to emerge (Zillmann 2000, 38, 41). In addition, there are many situations 
in which we find humor that have nothing to do with ridiculing others. Thus, the superiority 
theory can only account for the success of humor under certain circumstances, and other 
theories of humor are required.   
By contrast, the “incongruity theory” of humor postulates that relief generates laughter 
(Zillmann 2000, 43). A problem is introduced to audience members that builds up apprehension 
or some other strained expectation, but the problem is suddenly resolved in an unexpected way; 
in other words, the audience realizes that their initial understanding of an ambiguous situation 
was incorrect (Zillmann 2000, 43, 44). The remaining nervous energy, now lacking a purpose, is 
then released as laughter (Zillmann 2000, 43). The problem can be as large as impending physical 
danger (rustling bushes that prove to be a harmless rabbit), or as small as incompatible contexts 
(Zillmann gives the example: “‘Doctor, doctor. I broke my arm in three places.’ ‘Well, stay away 
from them in the future.’”) (Zillmann 2000, 43). Following the “conflict-resolution” framework of 
humor, the resolution is found in the recognition of the ambiguity (Zillmann 2000, 44). When this 
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process requires some mental work on the part of the audience (for example, in ironic humor), 
the sense of achievement and inclusion from “getting the joke” (and the exclusionist possibility 
that others might have “missed the point”) adds to the amused reaction (Zillmann 2000, 44; Marx 
and Sienkiewicz 2018, 102–3). Again, not all instances of incongruity result in laughter.  
English-literature scholar Jerry Farber 10  expands on ideas from incongruity theory to 
develop a more robust framework for studying humor (Farber 2007, 67–68, 72). He suggests that 
humorous situations are made up of two incongruous elements which serve specific roles: 
element A represents the social norm or more acceptable idea, and element B is linked11 to A in 
such a way as to undermine that norm (Farber 2007, 69). Then, the move from A to B in the set-
up evokes some gratifying shift in the internal state of the perceiver: from state [a], the 
internalized constraint, to an opposing state [b], some strong inclination (Farber 2007, 69). He 
retains the idea of a “comic frame of mind” with his concept of “play”: a mode which allows 
people to briefly suspend realistic assessments so that the [b] can ascend over [a] (Farber 2007, 
69). However, he stipulates that for the situation to be funny, A is not fully eliminated, but rather 
remains in place in some way to continue evoking the restrictive norm (Farber 2007, 70–71). The 
A and B are not always both explicitly given, and thus, individuals’ variable ability to “read in” 
these elements, based on their individual [a] and [b] states, contribute to their differing levels of 
amusement in their responses (Farber 2007, 73–76).  
Farber explores several different kinds of humor using this framework: derisive humor 
(which incorporates ideas from superiority theory), empathetic humor, and counter-restriction 
                                                     
10 Interestingly, there is also a comedian named Jerry Farber.  
11 Farber uses “link” to connect B to A instead of “resolution” to make his framework more inclusive and 
therefore broadly applicable (Farber 2007, 68).  
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humor (which includes aggressive, sexual, and nonsense humor). In derisive humor, [a] is the 
sense of others’ superiority developed through social interactions and experiencing personal 
failures, and [b] is a personal need for superiority (Farber 2007, 73). The A in these cases is 
established as someone superior (or even just “normal”) who is then reduced to B so that the 
perceiver’s inferiority is denied and displaced onto the other (Farber 2007, 73–77). In empathetic 
humor, the [a] remains the same as before, but the [b] becomes a desire to be included (Farber 
2007, 77). The B then becomes a reduction of A that the perceiver is willing to identify with, giving 
audiences a sense of relief that their failures are shared (Farber 2007, 77). In counter-restriction 
humor, the A is some internalized restriction, and the B is the inclination being restricted, 
whether it be a desire to act with aggression, break sexual taboos, or evade rational thought 
(Farber 2007, 78–84). These modes of humor are not mutually exclusive; for example, someone 
can experience both empathetic and derisive humor when they find that their struggles are 
shared by others who are in even worse situations (Farber 2007, 77).  
Under Farber’s framework, humor naturally reveals incongruities, thus allowing it to 
become a vehicle for social criticism and to expose inconsistencies within our understandings of 
the world (Farber 2007, 84). Farber is careful to stipulate that, while humor can criticize society, 
not all humor does (Farber 2007, 84). In addition, humor naturally creates boundaries between 
groups—those who the joke is “for” and those who the joke excludes—and it therefore 
contributes to group identification and solidarity (J. Lowe 1986, 440; Gilbert 2004, 14). Thus, 
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when a humorous expression deals with race or ethnicity (which hereafter will be referred to as 
“ethnic humor,” for short), several different, and sometimes overlapping, results may emerge12.  
First, ethnic humor can be used to put down marginalized groups—people who live within 
America but are denied full social, cultural, political, or economic inclusion and thus have less 
power and control (Gilbert 2004, 4, 5). This type of humor largely falls under Farber’s category of 
derisive humor. Social historian Joseph Boskin explains that within the United States, ethnic 
humor originated to maintain the dominant groups’ power, and it expressed their feelings of 
social class superiority and hostility against marginalized immigrants and races (Boskin and 
Dorinson 1985, 81; J. Lowe 1986, 442). Marginalized individuals have also adopted these 
stereotypes and wielded them against both other marginalized groups and themselves (“self-
deprecating” humor) (J. Lowe 1986, 439). This self-deprecating humor, author and comedienne 
Joanne Gilbert postulates, might in some cases arise from the individual’s desire to be accepted 
by the dominant culture: joking about themselves “proves” that they also have a sense of humor 
(Gilbert 2004, 20). Group identification is useful in understanding how such disparaging jokes are 
received by audiences. Researchers have found that the ethnicities of the victor and victim in a 
joke are correlated with how funny research participants find that joke (Zillmann 2000, 38). If the 
participants are more positively disposed towards the victor than the victim, they tend to find 
the joke funnier than if they are more positively disposed towards the victim (Zillmann 2000, 38).  
Second, ethnic humor, including self-deprecating humor, can be used subversively by the 
racially and ethnically marginalized as an act of socially-acceptable aggression that challenges 
                                                     
12 There are other results that ethnic humor can produce not listed here, and humor created by racially or 
ethnically marginalized individuals is certainly not limited to racial or ethnic humor. 
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oppression (J. Lowe 1986, 448; Gilbert 2004, 10, 14). The marginalized status gives some of these 
individuals an “outsider’s” perspective which separates them from dominant discourses and 
positions them advantageously to criticize mainstream assumptions and structures (J. Lowe 1986, 
448; Gilbert 2004, xiii, 5, 18). The humorous context—the play mindset—then allows the criticism 
to emerge in a more palatable and nonthreatening guise, as “just” a joke (Gilbert 2004, 10). 
Gilbert considers the commodification of such performances to also be an act of subversion: the 
dominant culture literally pays to see the social disparity being challenged (Gilbert 2004, xi). 
However, she was referring specifically to standup comedy, and the economics of other forms of 
humor are not as straightforward.  
Third, ethnic humor can bring groups together by facilitating communication and 
mediating conflict (J. Lowe 1986, 442). In these cases, common human failures can become a 
bridge between cultures, an example of Farber’s category of empathetic humor (J. Lowe 1986, 
442). Fourth, ethnic humor can affirm ethnic pride (Boskin and Dorinson 1985, 82). Third(plus)-
generation Americans who may be further removed from their heritage cultures can use ethnic 
humor and other such markers as a way to maintain a connection to their ethnic identity and 
express their “insider” status within an ethnic group, called “symbolic ethnicity” by Herbert 
Gans13 (J. Lowe 1986, 453). English-literature scholar John Lowe suggests that ethnicity may be 
increasingly used as a means of self-expression in people’s lives (J. Lowe 1986, 453). Gilbert, too, 
has suggested that, as America has shifted from assimilation to cultural pluralism narratives, self-
                                                     
13 However, Greek Studies scholar Yiorgos Anagnostou also critiques “symbolic ethnicity,” which is a 
concept of (primarily white) ethnicity as a “situational deployment of ‘easily expressed and felt’ cultural 
symbols” (Anagnostou 2009, 95). Symbolic ethnicity offers whites the ability to choose their identities 
while denying biracial and racially marginalized individuals the same freedom (Anagnostou 2009, 107).  
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deprecation within ethnic humor has become less common (Gilbert 2004, 19). She notes that a 
decrease in the pressure to internalize “WASP”14 values and a raised sensitivity to the damaging 
effects of stereotyping has restricted the “license” to make disparaging jokes about a racially or 
ethnically marginalized group to members of that group (Gilbert 2004, 19). Again, some, all, or 
none of these four readings of ethnic humor—marginalization, subversion, cross-cultural 
unification, and ethnic pride—may apply to an audience member’s reception of a race or 
ethnicity-based humorous expression.  
Although superiority theory, incongruity theory, and Farber’s expansion on the latter 
offer a wide variety of ways to interpret and analyze the effects of humor, Sigmund Freud argues 
that people themselves do not know what actually makes them laugh (Zillmann 2000, 45). Instead, 
he proposes that people laugh hardest at socially unacceptable, tendentious humor (which 
Zillmann connects to superiority theory humor), but this laughter feels permissible because they 
have wrongly ascribed their amusement to the innocuous elements of the comedic plot (related 
to incongruity theory humor) (Zillmann 2000, 44–45). Together, these three theories, superiority 
theory, incongruity theory, and misattribution theory have been able to predict what elements 
will make a set-up—on average—more or less humorous in experimental tests (Zillmann 2000). 
Of course, none of them can predict whether an individual will find something funny. Therefore, 
while this thesis will use these theories and frameworks to offer potential readings of comedic 
and humorous texts, its focus will be on the contexts which inform the texts’ production, 
discussed next.  
                                                     
14 White Anglo-Saxon Protestant  
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4. Comedy, Commercial Media Industries, and Race 
 Because one humorous moment can amuse people in a variety of ways, comedic media 
can potentially reach wide audiences (Marx and Sienkiewicz 2018, 6). Comedy’s popularity 
attests to this reach: around 1990, comedy made up 40% of the top 100 film rentals and 46% of 
the top 100 television shows, taking by far the biggest share of any genre15 (Zillmann 2000, 46). 
This broad appeal, in addition to the lower cost of production for comedy compared to action, 
makes comedy an attractive genre for media producers to experiment with during times of 
transition or uncertainty in the media industry (Marx and Sienkiewicz 2018, 6). For example, the 
most popular early films were comedies, the move from radio to television was facilitated by 
sitcoms, the early internet was formed around short comedies like viral videos, and the current 
television industry has borrowed comedy forms from internet culture to stay relevant in the post-
network era (Marx and Sienkiewicz 2018, 7–8).  
Despite comedy’s broad appeal to audiences and producers alike, the reception of specific 
comedic moments is dependent on individual experiences. That is, if a comedic bit is to amuse, 
the rules or norms that it plays with (the A in Farber’s framework) must already be familiar to the 
perceivers, obtained through their interactions with society16. Therefore, comedy producers 
must negotiate between the broad (a sense of “shared” human experience which gives comedy 
                                                     
15 A more recent survey shows that as of November 2018, comedy television shows are considered very 
or somewhat favorable by 88% of U.S. respondents (the highest percent attained by the represented 
genres, closely followed by action/adventure at 87%) (Statista 2018). In North America from 1995 to 2019, 
comedy was ranked fourth in most popular movie genres, based on global box office revenue (preceded 
by adventure, action, and drama) (Statista 2019b). 
16 The rules or norms in comedy are implied by the external contexts in which the humorous expression 
is formed, but spelling out these rules can destroy the humorous effect (Marx and Sienkiewicz 2018, 29). 
As a result, comedy is generally less universal than genres like tragedy, in which the rules being confronted 
are explicitly outlined (Marx and Sienkiewicz 2018, 30).  
 27 
 
wide appeal) and the specific (the cultural, economic, and political contexts that shape the 
individual’s experience of comedy) (Marx and Sienkiewicz 2018, 171).  
When race or ethnicity-based identity politics meets comedy, this negotiation can 
produce contradictory results. While a comedy producer might intend to critique racial 
hegemonies through subversion (introduced in the previous section), they may also seek 
mainstream appeal, and thus the humor that delivers the critique becomes ambivalent (Marx 
and Sienkiewicz 2018, 172). On the level of individual audience members, some may read the 
humor as criticizing dominant structures, while others may instead read the humor in a way that 
perpetuates the structures it was intended to dismantle (Marx and Sienkiewicz 2018, 171).  
In the case of racial stereotyping in comedy, some critical scholars suggest that the latter 
consequence (normalizing racialized differences and hierarchies) predominates (Marx and 
Sienkiewicz 2018, 185, 186). For example, the “buddy-cop” movie Rush Hour 2 (2001) disrupts 
convention by casting an African American man and an Asian man as the leads, yet it also includes 
blatant racial stereotypes (Marx and Sienkiewicz 2018, 184). Like genre conventions (e.g. the 
“meet cute” in romantic comedies), stereotyping allows media producers to quickly convey 
information about situations and characters that are widely intelligible, thus instilling 
expectations in the audience which can then be manipulated for comic effect (Marx and 
Sienkiewicz 2018, 135, 184–85, 197).  
In a study by Park et al. (2006), a majority of white, black, and Asian focus group 
respondents perceived the racial stereotypes and jokes in the movie as permissible because of 
the context (without which, respondents acknowledged, the jokes would be offensive) (Marx and 
Sienkiewicz 2018, 188–89). First, the film is a comedy, and racial stereotypes should therefore 
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not be taken seriously; second, racial minorities were making the racial jokes17; third, racial jokes 
were directed at white, black, and Asian groups18; and fourth, the two main characters making 
most of the jokes, Carter and Lee, are close friends who aren’t offended themselves, relegating 
the jokes to mere banter (Marx and Sienkiewicz 2018, 189–91). Despite their insistence that the 
racial stereotypes should not be taken seriously, most respondents indicated that they believed 
the stereotypes were based on truth (Marx and Sienkiewicz 2018, 192). Therefore, comedy which 
disarms viewers with “harmless” humor can subtly perpetuate stereotypes that influence or 
validate racialized worldviews (Marx and Sienkiewicz 2018, 193–94).  
In summary, studying humor provides insights into contemporary American power 
relations (Gilbert 2004, xvii). Specifically, because individual identity and perspectives strongly 
affect how comedy is performed and processed, comedy is not equally funny to everyone (Marx 
and Sienkiewicz 2018, 209). Therefore, as Marx and Sienkiewicz state, “the American 
entertainment industries must consciously decide who gets to make comedy and which 
audiences they will target” (Marx and Sienkiewicz 2018, 209). 
5. Thesis Questions   
 The sociopolitical place of Asian Americans in the United States has both produced and is 
a product of racialized media depictions (see Chapter 2). Media producers can choose to use 
humor to empower or oppress the racially marginalized, since humor can both serve as a bridge 
of common humanity between racial groups or contribute to the normalization of stereotyped 
                                                     
17 Respondents suggest that white people making the jokes would have been viewed as perpetrators of 
racism (Marx and Sienkiewicz 2018, 190).  
18 Though the researchers found that racial jokes directed at whites occur far less frequently, their limited 
presence gave the impression that all races are targeted (Marx and Sienkiewicz 2018, 190–91).  
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racial differences. Humor is therefore an informative lens through which to examine Asian 
American representations. 
This thesis asks how sociopolitical contexts and production culture have influenced the 
humor within films which feature Asian and Asian American casts. Specifically, the thesis uses 
The Flower Drum Song (1957 book by C. Y. Lee and 1961 film adaptation by Ross Hunter) and 
Crazy Rich Asians (2013 book by Kevin Kwan and 2018 film adaptation by Jon M. Chu) as case 
studies. These films, both romantic comedies, are analyzed through Jerry Farber’s framework by 
offering potential readings of selected moments of humor, based on superiority theory, 
incongruity theory, and misattribution theory. These moments are also compared to their 
counterparts in the books, if such counterparts exist. Both films are contextualized by industry 
trends, generic conventions, and United States sociopolitical currents. In addition, the production 
decisions and reception of these works are discussed.  
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Chapter 2: Asian American Histories and Media Representations  
 
Asian American images in media today do not emerge in isolation. Instead, they 
constantly recycle, reference, and react to historical representations. Embedded in this history 
are the political and social motivations of an emerging and developing nation: The United States 
of America (U.S.). As the country attempted to define itself and what it means to be American 
throughout the decades, it has frequently marginalized racial minorities through both policy and 
representation. However, these racial minorities will soon make up a majority of the U.S., and 
the increasing number of multiracial individuals has even brought the meaning and relevance of 
“race” into question (Takaki 1998, 504; Tavernise 2018). As minority and multiracial groups gain 
voices and power, and film and television markets become increasingly global, the untenable and 
narrow stereotypes within media conventions are increasingly challenged, to some degree of 
influence on media institutions and ideologies. Therefore, in order to answer the questions of 
this thesis, first, historical film and television representations of Asians and Asian Americans must 
be understood.  
This chapter aims to give a broad overview of Asian American histories, their images in 
Hollywood, and the sociopolitical motivations which influenced both. The first section describes 
how Asian Americans have played a fundamental role in the economic and racial development 
of the United States, discussing first the entry of Asians into the U.S. on economic terms, and 
second, some examples of how Asian Americans are entangled in the nation’s understanding of 
race. The next section expands on the latter point, with an overview of how anti-Asian sentiments, 
stemming in part from a tradition of Orientalism, have contributed to concepts of “whiteness” in 
the U.S. and formulated media depictions of Asians as menacing threats. Anti-Asian sentiments 
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also generated anti-Asian miscegenation laws and related “yellow face” and whitewashing 
practices within Hollywood, discussed in the third section. The remaining parts of this chapter 
cover the shift in the national formulation during the post-World War II/Cold War era, at which 
time the U.S. tried to position itself as a champion for racial tolerance and capitalism, giving rise 
to Asian femininity and model minority stereotypes (sections four and five, respectively).  
1. Asian American Histories as United States History  
Asians have been living in North America since before the country was even founded, with 
the first recorded Filipino settlement in 1763 New Orleans (Galang 2003, 162). The first large 
wave of Asian immigration to the U.S. came in the mid-19th century, following the first Opium 
War in China (S. S.-H. Lee 2014, 29–31). Push factors such as economic decline and civil conflict 
in southern China, coupled with pull factors like the California Gold Rush and other commercial 
or labor opportunities, drove an unprecedented number of Chinese immigrants to the U.S. (S. S.-
H. Lee 2014, 29–31). The poorer portion of these immigrants were indentured laborers, who 
were envisioned as partial substitutes for black slave labor once the African slave trade was 
abolished (S. S.-H. Lee 2014, 32). Shortly thereafter came immigrants from Japan, Korea, India, 
the Philippines, and most recently, Southeast Asia, all under different circumstances (S. S.-H. Lee 
2014, 38–57, 273–83).  
The complex ways in which Asian Americans were required for the economic 
development of the U.S., but were deprived of political citizenship and excluded from the 
national culture prior to World War II (WWII) (discussed further in the next section), has 
continued to influence the position of Asian Americans in U.S. society in the 21st century (L. Lowe 
1998, 42). For example, immigration restrictions, disenfranchisement, and exclusion from 
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domestic life limited the growth of pre-WWII Asian American populations, so after the 1965 
Immigration and Nationality Act lifted national origin-based immigration quotas, immigrants 
from Asia outnumbered existing Asian American populations and the majority of Asian Americans 
are now foreign-born, though the percentage varies by age, state, and nation of origin (L. Lowe 
1998, 44; López, Ruiz, and Patten 2017; S. S.-H. Lee 2014, 317). This and other effects of 
exploitation and marginalization require that studies of Asian America be interdisciplinary, 
combining and challenging traditional disciplines of history, literature, arts, and social science, 
and defying clear divisions between economic, political, and cultural motivations (L. Lowe 1998, 
42). What emerges from these studies is not just a picture of Asian America, but a revised 
understanding of the United States itself. Lisa Lowe writes: “The history of Asian American 
formation highlights the production of race… and it rewrites the history of the United States as a 
complex racial history” (L. Lowe 1998, 42).  
Despite media tendencies to frame racial politics as Black-and-White issues, Asian 
America does not exist in the margins of these politics (Beltrán and Fojas 2008, 3). Instead, 
tensions in both white and non-white America (including intra-minority tensions) have drawn 
Asian American communities into the conversation, both through active participation and by 
being involuntarily blamed or weaponized. This theme of complex interracial interaction is 
demonstrated in Ronald Takaki’s review of three developments which occurred in the 1990s.  
The first event was the 1992 Los Angeles Riot/Uprising. That year, four white police 
officers who had brutally beaten a black man, Rodney King, were deemed not-guilty in court 
(Takaki 1998, 493). The outrage that followed led to the razing of the Koreatown near South 
Central Los Angeles by the local black and Latinx communities (Takaki 1998, 493–94; S. S.-H. Lee 
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2014, 346). Governmental neglect of and cultural misunderstandings between the black and the 
Korean communities played a central role in the uprising and resulting devastation (Takaki 1998, 
494–96). The black community, left to face inner-city poverty caused by deindustrialization and 
white flight, was desperate, frustrated, and angry with class divisions that they believed Koreans 
stood on the opposite side of, resulting in the murders of several Korean shop owners (Takaki 
1998, 495–96; S. S.-H. Lee 2014, 344–45).  
Also excluded from white society, Koreans and their businesses were not protected by 
the local police during the looting (S. S.-H. Lee 2014, 346). The Korean community had found that 
serving the otherwise underserved black and Latinx neighborhoods was a niche business model 
with low cultural and financial barriers-to-entry (S. S.-H. Lee 2014, 344). However, many also 
believed the media stereotypes which depicted blacks as violent and lazy criminals, leading to 
the shooting of a black girl, Latasha Harlins, by Korean shopkeeper Soon Ja Du, whose subsequent 
lack of jailtime angered the black community (Takaki 1998, 494). The racial tensions that fueled 
the uprising therefore reflected complex multiracial dynamics between blacks, whites, and Asians. 
It also brought into question the role of intra-Asian allegiances and Asian American identities: 
were the riots a Korean American issue alone, or an Asian American issue (S. S.-H. Lee 2014, 347)? 
The second development was the weaponizing of Asian American university admissions 
against affirmative action policies. In the mid-1980s, researchers found that Asian American 
admission rates to various universities around the nation had been dropping—due to 
discriminatory policy changes, in the case of The University of California at Berkeley—and 
conservatives quickly picked up the issue in service of dismantling affirmative action policies 
(Takaki 1998, 498–99). These politicians claimed that affirmative action was “reverse 
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discrimination” against Asian Americans, unfairly benefitting black and Latinx applicants and 
undermining the “meritocracy” of America (Takaki 1998, 498–99).  
In California, the fight culminated in the 1996 ballot that included Proposition 209, which 
would effectively abolish affirmative action (Takaki 1998, 500). Republican Party support of the 
proposition relied on using the Asian American angle to hide from accusations of racism (Takaki 
1998, 500). However, not all of these supposed beneficiaries bought into the rhetoric: a majority 
of Asian American votes (61%) were against the proposition19 (Takaki 1998, 501). Through the 
educational efforts of Asian American civil rights organizations, many Asian Americans had 
recognized that they too benefitted from affirmative action, and many understood the need to 
provide interracial support to the fight against discrimination (Takaki 1998, 501–2).  
In recent months (October 2018), a new trial has appeared in a federal district court. The 
case brought by Students for Fair Admissions claims that Harvard discriminates against Asian 
Americans in admissions (Hartocollis 2018). It remains to be seen whether the case will advance 
to the Supreme Court, and if so, what the implications will be for using race as a factor in 
admissions processes. Once again, Asian Americans are being pitted against other minority 
groups while acting as a shield against charges of racism for those who wish to dismantle 
affirmative action20.   
Finally, Takaki’s third development is of the increasingly multicultural and multiracial 
Asian America. Not only has the concept of Asian American identities emerged, transcending 
                                                     
19 The proposition did end up passing 54% to 46% (Takaki 1998, 501).  
20 The plaintiff is led by white conservative American Edward Blum, who had previously lost another 
Supreme Court case against affirmative action: Fisher v The University of Texas (Hartocollis 2018). Blum 
has stated that he specifically “needed Asian plaintiffs” for his Harvard case (Hinger 2018). 
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national origins, but identities are also spreading beyond Asian cultural heritage through mixed-
race families and artistic expression which draws from a multitude of cultural inspirations (Takaki 
1998, 502–8). In fact, the fastest growing portion of Asian America has been the mixed-race 
population, who were finally allowed to recognize their multiracial background on the 2000 
Census (S. S.-H. Lee 2014, 347). Their increasingly visible presence asks whether traditional racial 
categories are still relevant (S. S.-H. Lee 2014, 348). Some claim that we are moving towards a 
post-racial society, while others consider racial transcendence a utopian fantasy (S. S.-H. Lee 2014, 
348). 
2. Chinese Exclusion Act and Orientalism 
Almost as soon as the nation was founded, the privilege of United States citizenship has 
been tied to whiteness. This requirement was turned into legal code by the Naturalization Act of 
1790, which stated that only a “free white person” was eligible for naturalization (S. S.-H. Lee 
2014, 122). Even post-Civil War, changes to naturalization law which made “persons of African 
descent” eligible still excluded those of Asian descent (S. S.-H. Lee 2014, 123). This bar was made 
explicit in 1882 with the Chinese Exclusion Act, creating the first federal law which determined 
who could and could not immigrate to the United States21 (S. S.-H. Lee 2014, 123).  
However, the status of non-Chinese Asians remained uncertain, and throughout the early 
20th century, several naturalization court cases such as Ozawa v. United States (1922) and United 
States v. Bhagat Singh Thind (1923) centered around the vagueness of the term “white”22 (S. S.-
                                                     
21 And thereby creating the first “illegal” immigrants. 
22  Questions included: Does “white” refer to light skin color? Does it include the “ethnographically 
Caucasian” Asian Indians? 
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H. Lee 2014, 123–24). The decisions in these cases proved that those with governmental power 
wanted to exclude immigrants who were not of Caucasian European descent23. By the 1930s, all 
Asian nationals had been barred from immigration whether through law or court cases, except 
for Filipinos24, who were still made aliens under the 1934 Tydings-McDuffie Act and given a 
meager 50-person immigration quota per year (S. S.-H. Lee 2014, 123–25). Not until the 
Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 (also called the McCarran-Walter Act) were the last of 
the anti-Asian, race-based eligibility restrictions abolished (Galang 2003, 164).   
Lisa Lowe explains that prior to World War II, these anti-Asian immigration and 
naturalization restrictions helped resolve the nation’s tensions between its economic need for 
cheap labor and its political need to imagine a homogenous, culturally-unified nation (L. Lowe 
1998, 31). With the status of these “nonwhite” Asians codified, the United States could maximize 
its profits by recruiting Asian labor, while preventing labor oversupply and ensuring that these 
disenfranchised groups could not accumulate capital or access the political sphere, effectively 
distancing them from the conception of national culture (L. Lowe 1998, 31). 
This institutionalized division was both a symptom of and generator for anti-Asian 
nativism. Shelley Sang-Hee Lee argues that the anti-Asian sentiment from the late 1800s to early 
1900s was driven by social and economic anxieties of the time, especially the Long Depression, 
which started in 1873 (S. S.-H. Lee 2014, 144–45). Politicians, faced with high unemployment, 
discontent, and labor uprisings, promoted immigration restriction as the solution to the 
                                                     
23 The construction of the “white” vs “nonwhite” dichotomy both consolidated European descendants as 
“white” and based the formation of Asian American “race” on legal definitions rooted in national origins 
(L. Lowe 1998, 31). Yet, as noted in Chapter 1, biology became closely tied to understandings of that race. 
24 The Philippines were annexed by the United States in 1898, and Filipinos were considered U.S. nationals 
until 1934 (S. S.-H. Lee 2014, 125). 
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depression, specifically targeting the Chinese (S. S.-H. Lee 2014, 145). At the forefront of anti-
Chinese movements were other marginalized groups: working men, European immigrants, and 
white women (S. S.-H. Lee 2014, 144–46). These individuals found a sense of identity, solidarity, 
and empowerment through the xenophobic identification of a common “enemy” (S. S.-H. Lee 
2014, 144–46).  
Anti-Asian sentiment in the U.S. did not start nor end with the Long Depression. It had its 
roots in Orientalism, a European imagination of the “East” (read: the unknown) which developed 
in conjunction with Europe’s ideas of itself, as Edward Said theorized (Hsing and Xing 1998, 164–
65). The “Orient” was thus created as a mysterious and threatening place, inferior to the Occident, 
and perpetually backwards and feminized (S. S.-H. Lee 2014, 6–8). Inherent in this process was 
the production of difference and the “othering” of the Orient and its people (Hsing and Xing 1998, 
64). 
In the United States, Orientalism began as an appreciation for the distant, “exotic” lands 
of China and India, where luxury goods were produced, with whom profitable trade relations 
might be developed, and whose philosophy and spiritual writings informed American political 
thought  (S. S.-H. Lee 2014, 9–14). However, once the U.S. began directly trading with China and 
therefore experienced increased interaction with Chinese people, these idealistic myths 
dissipated, and frustrated U.S. traders who were only familiar with capitalist trading relations 
began describing the Chinese as uncivilized and corrupt (S. S.-H. Lee 2014, 13). Thus, the 
American notions of the Orient began to align with their European counterpart’s.  
Hollywood depictions of Asia and Asians reflected and perpetuated these notions of the 
Orient as “other” (Hsing and Xing 1998, 64). For Asian men, these depictions were shaped by the 
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“Yellow Peril” formula: stereotypes which depicted Asians as violent hordes which threatened 
the U.S. nation-state (Hsing and Xing 1998, 55). Common images included Asian men as rapists 
and enemies of war (Hsing and Xing 1998, 55–58). Asian women, by contrast, were frequently 
depicted as exotically sexual: in some cases, they were represented as the dangerously 
manipulative “dragon lady,” and in other cases, they were delicate and submissive spoils (Hsing 
and Xing 1998, 57–61). These images have persisted throughout the decades and continue to 
inform current representation.  
3. Anti-miscegenation and “Yellow Face” 
Closely tied to the imagination of Asia as a threat was dominant America’s desire to 
“protect” white women from Asian men. In the late 19th and early 20th centuries, a convergence 
of sensationalist stories and other racial and gendered factors led to anxieties surrounding 
relationships between white women and Asian men25 (S. S.-H. Lee 2014, 127–28). These factors 
included the crystallization of the concept of whiteness 26 , the increasing presence of Asian 
immigrants in the workplace and domestic sphere, stereotypes of Asian men as sexually deviant, 
and the transgressive consumption and modernity of the “New Woman” which threatened 
Puritanical morality (Beltrán and Fojas 2008, 7; Miyao 2007, 36–39, 42; S. S.-H. Lee 2014, 127–
28). In addition, the pseudoscientific argument of “hybrid degeneracy” dominated conversations 
around racial mixing: it claimed that children of mixed race couples were impure, degenerate, 
psychologically unstable, and biologically and morally inferior (Beltrán and Fojas 2008, 9–10). To 
                                                     
25 These anxieties emerged despite the fact that very few Asian immigrants sought to marry whites at the 
time (S. S.-H. Lee 2014, 127). 
26  The dominant concept was of hypodescent, in which “one-drop” of non-white blood excluded an 
individual from being white, and it reinforced the white/nonwhite racial binary (Beltrán and Fojas 2008, 
5). 
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reel in these fears held by white, patriarchal America, anti-Asian miscegenation laws were passed, 
starting with additions to the California Civil Code in 1880 (S. S.-H. Lee 2014, 127).   
In media industries, the response to these fears was to enact the Production Code of 1934, 
which, though vague, forbid presenting sexual relations between individuals of different races on 
screen (Beltrán and Fojas 2008, 7). As a result, when mixed race couples were portrayed, the 
non-white characters were frequently played by white or half-white actors to comfort audiences 
with the knowledge that they were not seeing “actual” miscegenation (Beltrán and Fojas 2008, 
8). Examples include Madame Butterfly (1915), The Bitter Tea of General Yen (1933), The World 
of Suzie Wong (1960), and West Side Story (1961).  
Helen Zia reveals that these yellow face practices were not limited to mixed-race romantic 
storylines. Instead, it was routine for any major film and television role to be given to white actors 
while Asian actors were sequestered into minor parts (Zia 2000, 113). These white actors were 
frequently praised for their interpretations of “Asian” qualities, based primarily on stereotypes 
of Orientalism and Yellow Peril hysteria (Zia 2000, 114). In order to play these racialized roles, 
they practiced “marking” themselves with distinguishable “racial” traits: using taped eyelids and 
other racial cosmetology techniques to take on “Asian” features, dressing and behaving in 
inscrutable and otherwise Orientalized ways, and employing heavy “chop suey” accents (Hsing 
and Xing 1998, 66–67).  
One preferred practice is making characters “Eurasian” so white actors can play Asian 
characters with less or no cosmetology (Hsing and Xing 1998, 75). From the film Love is a Many 
Splendored Thing (1955) to the show Kung Fu (1972-1975), Hollywood has a long tradition in this 
vein, and it even continues putting white characters into part-Asian roles today, as shown by 
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Emma Stone’s character in Aloha (2015) (Singh 2015). The main issues with the practice of yellow 
face, or more recently, whitewashing, are exemplified by the controversy that surrounded the 
Miss Saigon casting in 1990. 
Originally produced in England by Cameron Mackintosh, the musical was being brought 
to Broadway, but it was announced that the Welsh actor-singer Jonathan Pryce would continue 
to star as the Eurasian Engineer (Zia 2000, 119). Asian American actors, who did not get a chance 
to audition for this prominent role, were furious, but the casting director’s response was to list 
every Asian actor he knew of and state that none of them would be suitable for the role, ignoring 
the array of Asian American actors who worked outside the mainstream, the few who had 
succeeded in the mainstream, and the barriers to entry which prevented more Asian American 
actors from becoming widely visible27 (Zia 2000, 121). The subtext was that Asian American actors 
were not good enough to play even themselves, but while covering the protests against the 
casting, the media turned the controversy against the actors, stating that they were “less 
qualified,” were engaging in “reverse discrimination,” and were trying to undermine color-blind 
casting28 (Zia 2000, 122–25). The main issue, though, was not whether actors can or should play 
across racial barriers, but that Asian and Asian American actors rarely get the opportunity to play 
themselves or characters of other backgrounds (Zia 2000, 127–28). Though Mackintosh 
eventually won and Pryce played the Engineer in the first Broadway run, Pryce did stop using eye 
prosthetics and successive Engineers were actors of Asian descent (Zia 2000, 124, 129). 
                                                     
27  And ignoring the fact that this casting director was perpetuating those same barriers which had 
prevented him from coming up with a better list of actors in the first place. 
28 The core conflict, then, is very similar to the controversy surrounding affirmative action. Minority 
players are kept from the table by discriminatory structures, call out those in power, and in response are 
called unqualified racists. 
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This pattern of protest, media ridicule and lack of immediate industry response, yet 
subsequent change has been played out frequently in recent years. One example is actress 
Scarlett Johansson, who played an Asian character in Ghost in the Shell (2017) despite 
controversy and backlash (B. Lee 2018). However, in her next controversial casting as a 
transgender man in Rub & Tug (not yet released), she did end up dropping the role29 (B. Lee 2018). 
Several factors likely contributed to her change of heart, but one might be found in the example 
of Ed Skrein, who in the previous year had publicly stepped aside to allow a more culturally 
appropriate actor to play a Japanese American character in Hellboy (2018) (Sun 2017; Couch 
2017). The praise he received both within and outside of the Asian American community and the 
industry at large may signal a change in Hollywood, placing more of the responsibility of being 
culturally sensitive on the actor and actress themselves (Sun 2017). 
4. Post-World War II and Constructing Asian Femininity 
Historian Robert G. Lee claims that World War II was the turning point which undercut 
the place of Yellow Peril and white supremacy narratives in the national imagination (R. G. Lee 
1999, 146). With China as an ally, Japan as an enemy, and the Allied powers’ reliance on support 
from colonies in India, southeast Asia, and north Africa, war propelled white Americans to 
recognize the distinctions between Asian groups (R. G. Lee 1999, 146). In addition, Nazi doctrines 
of racial superiority forced the U.S. to respond with calls for equality as a moral reason to fight in 
the war30 (R. G. Lee 1999, 149).  
                                                     
29 That she had even been cast in the first place (by the same director of Ghost in the Shell) and had 
originally accepted the role is telling that the industry still has further to go in understanding and 
internalizing minority concerns related to representation. 
30 In practice, the U.S. still used race and ethnicity as ways to suppress various groups including Japanese 
Americans, African Americans, and Jewish Europeans seeking refuge (R. G. Lee 1999, 149). 
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In the post-World War II era, European colonialism broke down, and in that gap, the U.S. 
wanted to situate itself as a world power which championed racial tolerance (Marchetti 1993, 
110). In order to set the terms of global economics and secure access to international markets 
and raw materials, the U.S. needed to establish military, economic, and ideological superiority (L. 
Lowe 1998, 34–35). Instead of using outright colonialism, it framed its dominance of Asia in terms 
of both a modernization project and a containment of communism (L. Lowe 1998, 34–35). 
Domestically, it conceived itself as being a “multicultural” nation instead of a white nation, and 
it slowly repealed the anti-Asian immigration and naturalization laws (S. S.-H. Lee 2014, 236–38). 
These developments will be discussed further in section 5. 
Gina Marchetti argues that the Hollywood melodramas set in Hong Kong both portrayed 
and enabled the U.S.’s self-definition as the masculine savior of a feminized Asia (Marchetti 1993, 
110).  She draws on the tradition of the "white knight" figure, rooted in the myth of romantic 
love overcoming social stigmas and the myth of the antiestablishment romantic artist 
transcending above a corrupt society (Marchetti 1993, 109). Despite the figure’s ideological 
stances, she argues that it does not allow for real social change because it promotes a subservient 
female role and maintains the right for the dominant culture to rule (Marchetti 1993, 109). For 
her case studies, she analyzes Love Is a Many-Splendored Thing (1955) and The World of Suzie 
Wong (1960), where the "exotic" background allows America to assert itself as morally superior 
to both European colonialism and Asian communism31 (Marchetti 1993, 110).  
                                                     
31 Sayonara (1956), though set in Japan, displays similar assertions of American identity (R. G. Lee 1999, 
161–72)   
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In her examination, Marchetti uncovers three myths which drive the themes of these films. 
The first myth is of the “white knight,” a morally pure white male savior who finds himself by 
saving the "ethnic" love interest from her native land32 (Marchetti 1993, 113–18). The second 
myth is of “Asian femininity,” the fantasy of the passive, domestic Asian female as the ideal 
woman, countering the Western "new" woman 33  who engages in feminism and economic 
independence (Marchetti 1993, 115–17). Finally, the myth of the “Orient” lives on. In these films, 
the heroes' professions as artists and journalists give them license to create and interpret the 
Orient, and they control of the visual appearance and identities of their lovers (Marchetti 1993, 
118–23). 
 During the 1950s and 1960s, the masculinized U.S. and femininized Asia were given bodily 
form. The War Brides Act of 1945 and the McCarran-Walters Immigration and Nationality Act of 
1952 together allowed American military servicemen and citizens to bring their spouses and 
children to the U.S. (R. G. Lee 1999, 162). Around 6,000 Chinese, 45,000 Japanese, and thousands 
of Filipino women came, making the majority of Asian immigrants women (R. G. Lee 1999, 162). 
These women were integrated into the U.S. conception of the American family (and the nation 
at large) as a modern, ethnically assimilated space (R. G. Lee 1999, 162). However, this 
acceptance was framed by specific narratives. The World of Suzie Wong (1960) and Sayonara 
(1957) reveal that, in the cultural imagination, the previous association of mixed-race 
relationships with sexual transgression were now negated only because a superior America 
                                                     
32 A clear display of white supremacy, but tempered by accompanying portrayals of either the British or 
U.S. Southerners holding even more pronounced views of racial superiority than the main male character 
(Marchetti 1993, 115; R. G. Lee 1999, 170). 
33 A newer “New” woman than the “New” woman of the early 20th century which Miyao discusses in A 
Star is Born.  
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“domesticized” and “liberated” (a more apt word might be “conquered”) these Asian women, 
turning them into a symbol of ideal femininity and the mothers of a multi-ethnic nation (R. G. Lee 
1999, 162, 171; Marchetti 1993, 123). Simultaneously, these images reaffirmed the heterosexual 
patriarchy (R. G. Lee 1999, 171).  
Though Asian females were made part of the American family, Asian males continued to 
be marginalized in domestic life (R. G. Lee 1999, 162). Prior to WWII, anti-miscegenation laws 
and the restriction of Asian female immigration created “bachelor” communities of Asian men, 
which public health policies were able to construe as disease-ridden threats to American society 
(L. Lowe 1998, 33–34). The masculinity of white male citizens, closely tied to heterosexual 
marriage, was made at odds with the masculinity of these Asian men who were barred in one 
way or another from wedding and starting families (L. Lowe 1998, 34). Furthermore, the 
performance of “female” work such as laundry and restaurant service “femininized” Asian 
masculinity (L. Lowe 1998, 34).  
Post-WWII, this feminized imagination of Asian men persisted and created an easy, safe 
way for American society to transition Asian men from “Yellow Peril threats” to members of a 
“multicultural” society. Evidence of this marginalized incorporation is seen on television shows 
like Bachelor Father (1957-1962) and Bonanza (1959-73), where Asian men were allowed into 
the domestic space, but as the servile help, filling a “female” role in the household (Zia 2000, 
115). Another stereotype, called the “geek” by Helen Zia, depicted Asian men as hardworking, 
unemotional side characters, so asexual and emasculated that they couldn’t threaten the 
normative white American family (Zia 2000, 117–18).  This “acceptable,” effeminate version of 
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Asian men was part of the creation of an assimilated “model minority,” discussed further in the 
next section.  
5. The Cold War and the Model Minority Myth 
 Robert Lee argues that the model minority myth constructed an acceptable path towards 
“Americanization” while containing three menaces of the Cold War: communism, race mixing, 
and homosexuality (R. G. Lee 1999, 146). The myth reveals the contradiction between the U.S.’s 
desire for minority groups to ethnically assimilate and its continued production of racial 
difference and suppression of social transformation (R. G. Lee 1999, 145). First, Asia was used to 
position the Cold War-era United States as a champion of capitalism. The U.S.’s local economic 
strategy of the Fordist Compromise 34  depended on a capitalist reconstruction of the global 
economy (R. G. Lee 1999, 154–56). In Asia, nationalist elites who were favorable to the U.S. 
replaced previous European colonial administrations, development of trade with Japan and 
southeast Asia counterbalanced the “loss” of China to communism, and the Pacific Rim became 
a market for U.S. goods and capital investment (R. G. Lee 1999, 155–56). Asia thus became one 
of the battlefields for the “War of Containment” against communism, in addition to Africa and 
Latin America (R. G. Lee 1999, 157). However, to these “Third World” nations demanding 
independence and self-determination, the U.S.’s domestic struggles with racial discrimination 
and civil rights undercut its ideological stance against communism (which emphasized social 
equality) and its authority to supervise this global transformation (R. G. Lee 1999, 157). 
                                                     
34 The Fordist Compromise was a pattern of cooperation between labor and management (R. G. Lee 1999, 
154). It was built on the logic that the working-class nuclear family would drive economic growth through 
the consumption of durable consumer goods (R. G. Lee 1999, 154–55). 
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 In response to contentious race relations at home (the second menace), U.S. liberal social 
scientists developed an ethnicity theory which promised racial equality. When African Americans 
were demanding economic and political equality during the 1960s, the nation was divided on 
whether changes were required on the structural or individual level (R. G. Lee 1999, 150–51). 
That is, should the government intervene with state-sponsored social reconstruction, or did black 
families and black culture need to be “rehabilitated”? (R. G. Lee 1999, 150–51). Ethnicity theory, 
which replaced biological theories of racial superiority, asserted that, through ethnic assimilation 
and the removal of legal barriers, anyone could become a full participant in modern American 
society, with equal rights and upwards mobility (R. G. Lee 1999, 146, 158).  
However, the implications of this theory were that the cultures of ethnic groups 
determined their social outcomes, positive or negative, and the burden of “modernizing” ethnic 
cultures to fit U.S. society was placed upon the shoulders of non-white groups (R. G. Lee 1999, 
145, 158–59). An underlying idea behind this burden is the rag-to-riches Horatio Alger myth that, 
through hard work alone, individuals can escape poverty and achieve success (Ono and Pham 
2009, 81). Thus, ethnicity theory evaded race-based critiques through its promotion of a 
“colorblind” society that tied social improvements to individual efforts rather than political 
organization and empowerment (R. G. Lee 1999, 160).  
In the U.S., World War II also changed gender relations and expanded sexual freedom, 
resulting in the third menace to Cold War America: homosexuality (R. G. Lee 1999, 160). 
Homosexuality, like communism, became seen as a threat to national security, supposedly 
weakening the nation’s morality (making it vulnerable to seduction, both sexually and politically), 
perverting the “natural order,” and encouraging secrecy (a trait also tied to spies and traitors) (R. 
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G. Lee 1999, 161).  The traditional nuclear family was thus imagined as the key to defending the 
“American” way of life (R. G. Lee 1999, 160). The differential placement of Asian and Asian 
American women and men within this family was discussed previously in section four.   
To “prove” that ethnic assimilation works, Asian Americans were imagined as the model 
minority because of their comparative political silence and underutilization of welfare programs 
(R. G. Lee 1999, 151). The model minority myth portrayed Asian America as a quiet, hardworking, 
and successful community who took responsibility for itself and didn’t need government 
assistance (Hsing and Xing 1998, 63; Ono and Pham 2009, 80). In effect, the myth was used to 
indirectly critique and undermine the rising black rights movement (S. S.-H. Lee 2014, 263). 
However, the myth ignored factors which contributed to the community’s political silence, such 
as the post-incarceration PTSD of the Japanese American community and the deportation fears 
of the Chinese American community (R. G. Lee 1999, 151–53)35. In addition, the model minority 
myth erased the diversity across Asian ethnicities. For example, though Chinese and Japanese 
Americans did have higher levels of education and income, other groups including Filipino 
Americans and Southeast Asian refugees did not, and in 1970, 40% of the latter group depended 
on public assistance in California (S. S.-H. Lee 2014, 330).  
                                                     
35  Following the founding of the communist People’s Republic of China in 1949, Chinese Americans 
replaced Japanese Americans as the targets for U.S. suspicion (R. G. Lee 1999, 152). Various laws and 
programs such as the Emergency Detention Act, the Trading with the Enemy Act, and the Chinese 
Confession Program threatened Chinese Americans with detention and deportation should they be 
suspected of subversive activity that supported the Communist regime (but the pretense of finding pro-
China activity was also used to target domestic troublemakers) (R. G. Lee 1999, 152–53). In reality, there 
were very few Chinese American communists, but there were hundreds of “paper sons” who were 
threatened by the possibility of deeper investigation and subsequent deportation (R. G. Lee 1999, 152). 
These individuals were thus compelled to leave politically active organizations to avoid drawing attention 
to themselves (R. G. Lee 1999, 153).  
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The model minority myth and assimilation narrative have roots in the Charlie Chan 
character, a fictional detective created in the 1920s by Earl Derr Biggers (J. Chan 2001, 51). As a 
precursor to the 1960s’ use of the model minority myth to suppress African Americans, Charlie 
Chan’s image constructed Chinese Americans as model minorities, which countered the political 
activity of Japanese American laborers in Hawaii (J. Chan 2001, 51–52). Though the character is 
based on the real Honolulu detective Chang Apana, he lacks the bravery, agility, and strength 
that Apana had (J. Chan 2001, 54–55). Instead, Charlie Chan is depicted as a submissive, politically 
silent, law-abiding family man who is inferior both physically and sexually (J. Chan 2001, 53). 
Author Jachinson Chan argues that the character's construction by a white man and portrayal on-
screen by white actors is a form of colonialism, creating a false, non-threatening image of Chinese 
American men in the public consciousness, and forcing Asian American males to seek hegemonic 
forms of masculinity instead of allowing them to define their own versions of masculinity (J. Chan 
2001, 57–59). Thus, the Charlie Chan figure also adds to the long media histories of issues related 
to yellow face and Asian male masculinity, discussed earlier. 
Kent Ono and Vincent Pham argue that the model minority myth, despite appearing to 
praise Asian Americans, instead perpetuates Yellow Peril narratives in disguise (Ono and Pham 
2009, 81, 89). For example, the perceived educational success of Asian Americans has led to 
“white flight” from some Californian high schools because the “domination” of these schools by 
competitive Asian students creates an “unhealthy cultural isolation” (Ono and Pham 2009, 90–
91). UC Berkeley, too, has been said to have too many Asians, and a 2007 article by Timothy Egan 
raised the concern that, because of the increasing Asian presence, Berkeley is not diverse and 
suffers from stereotypes of being a boring, nerdy campus (Ono and Pham 2009, 91–92). The logic 
 49 
 
of feeling threatened by Asian students relies on the view of Asians and Asian Americans as 
“perpetual foreigners36.” In other words, Asian Americans, conflated with Asians, are seen as non-
American, and their increasing presence is therefore not considered beneficial to their 
institutions (nor America at large), but rather marks an Asian-ization of campus (and the nation) 
(Ono and Pham 2009, 92–93). By this formulation, Asian Americans are threatening because they 
are successful, and this fear is justified because they are socially or emotionally stunted 37 
foreigners. This perpetual foreigner myth has physical consequences38: in the 1980s and 1990s, 
violence and suspicion targeted against Asian Americans increased in the face of the economic 
success and global political influence of Japan in the 1970s-80s and China in the 1990s (S. S.-H. 
Lee 2014, 338–42). Thus, the model minority stereotype masks not only anti-Black racism, but 
also anti-Asian racism (S. S.-H. Lee 2014, 330). 
                                                     
36 From the 1880s, for example, Chinatowns had been treated as tourist destination for white Americans, 
and early media tended to represent them as completely foreign (Klein 2003, 175–76). 
37 These traits are corollaries of the model minority myth. Media depictions of Asians and Asian Americans 
as successful journalists, doctors, or students curb this “positive” representation with negative 
characteristics such as being “robotic, uncaring, and asocial” (Ono and Pham 2009, 95). These and other 
images based on the model minority stereotype reinforce the myth that Asian Americans are culturally 
and biologically wired to focus on achievement, to extreme measures criticized by the mainstream (e.g. 
painting Indian parents as single-mindedly drilling their children for spelling bees) (Ng, Lee, and Pak 2007, 
97–98).  
38 See Vincent Chin’s killing, discussed in Chapter 1. The perpetual foreigner myth also contributed to the 
WWII internment of Japanese Americans, who various U.S. political and military leaders suspected would 
aid Japanese war efforts, despite a resounding lack of evidence (S. S.-H. Lee 2014, 214–15). 
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Chapter 3: Flower Drum Song and Crazy Rich Asians 
Though the two films were released 57 years apart, Flower Drum Song (1961) and Crazy 
Rich Asians (2018) nevertheless have many similarities. Both are Hollywood romantic comedies 
which star majority Asian casts. They use newcomers—Mei Li in Flower Drum Song or Rachel Chu 
in Crazy Rich Asians—as audience proxies through whom viewers can experience a place with 
which they may not be familiar: San Francisco, Chinatown or a wealthy, elite Singaporean society. 
Their cinematography builds a colorful world of opulence and glamour, with an emphasis on 
culturally marked costumes and set designs (Willett 2006b; Hoo 2018). Their central conflicts are 
found in the purported cultural divide between Americans and Asians, mapped onto generational 
conflicts for Flower Drum Song and class conflicts for Crazy Rich Asians. Their contexts, too, are 
similar: they both emerged during times when American media was increasing its multicultural 
productions.  
The most notable difference in the production of these films is that Flower Drum Song 
was created by Richard Rodgers and Oscar Hammerstein II (Jewish Americans), and Crazy Rich 
Asians was directed by Jon M. Chu (a Chinese American). This chapter explores both the 
sociocultural changes which have allowed for that shift in production control and how having 
Asian Americans govern their own film representations has affected Crazy Rich Asians. An 
overview of Flower Drum Song and Crazy Rich Asians will be given in the first and second sections 
of this chapter, respectively. These sections review their respective novels, the adaptations, the 
sociocultural and production contexts, and the receptions. In the third section, the films are 
interpreted in context of their categorization as mainstream romantic comedies. The fourth 
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section discusses the ways in which accents and language function in the humor of the novel and 
film. Finally, this chapter ends with concluding remarks for this thesis.  
1. Flower Drum Song 
Novel 
Chin Yang Lee (popularly known as C. Y. Lee), was born in Hunan, China in 1917 (C. Y. Lee 
[1957] 2002, iii). He left the country during the turmoil of the Second World War, arriving in the 
United States in 1943 to obtain his M.F.A. in playwriting at the Yale School of Drama (C. Y. Lee 
[1957] 2002, iii, ix). After the Communist Party won in China, he chose to stay, and he relocated 
to San Francisco, Chinatown to write for local newspapers and begin his first novel (S. S.-H. Lee 
2014, 260; C. Y. Lee [1957] 2002, x, xi). Looking for inspiration, Lee studied scandals in the 
newspapers, but soon he decided to center his novel on the biggest conflicts he could find within 
Chinatown: the generation gap and cultural differences (Willett 2006a). From there, he wrote 
The Flower Drum Song (1957), which became a New York Times bestseller (Shin and Lee 2004, 
77).  
The novel centers around two main characters, the rich, widowed Wang Chi-yang (“Old 
Master Wang”) and his son, Wang Ta, who has unenthusiastically enrolled in medical school to 
avoid looking for a job. Five years before the start of the book’s timeline, Wang Chi-yang brings 
his two sons and family servants to the United States to avoid the Communists in China. Against 
the wishes of Madam Tang, his sister-in-law, he resists “Western” changes to his home and 
lifestyle, choosing to visit an herb doctor to treat his persistent cough39. Meanwhile Wang Ta 
                                                     
39 The book describes Wang Chi-yang as being contrary to, not Westernization specifically, but all change, 
explaining that the Communist’s enforcement of the Lenin uniform was enough of a departure from his 
customary silk gowns to be one of his motivators for leaving China (C. Y. Lee [1957] 2002, 5).  
 52 
 
struggles to find love, first with the already-engaged Mary, then with playgirl Linda Tung, and 
finally with the unattractive Helen Chao, who is driven to suicide after his rejection of her 
marriage proposal. His friend, Chang Ling-yu, blames Wang Ta’s difficulties in love on the 
shortage of women in Chinatown.  
In the second part of the book, Madam Tang and Wang Chi-yang find out about Helen’s 
death and Linda’s involvement in a passion-fueled shooting, and they worry about Wang Ta’s 
romantic life. The picture-bride who they find for him falls through because of immigration 
difficulties, and they arrange for him to marry a half-Japanese daughter of Madam Tang’s friend. 
At that time, May Li and her father, Old Man Li, arrive in San Francisco, Chinatown from Los 
Angeles. Wang Ta brings them into the Wang family home to work as servants. He and May Li fall 
in love, and his other marriage arrangement is canceled because neither party is interested. Then 
Liu Ma, one of the original family servants, frames May Li for stealing the family’s clock. The 
humiliated May Li and her father leave the Wangs, and Wang Ta, seeking to marry May Li, decides 
to assert his independence from his family and follow them. Wang Chi-yang, overcome with 
loneliness, finds his stubbornness dissolve, and he reimagines himself as a guest living in a world 
which belongs to the assimilated younger generation. The book ends with his visit to a hospital 
to treat his cough.   
Broadway and Film Adaptations 
 Hollywood writer and producer, Joseph Fields, purchased the rights to the book and 
brought it to Richard Rodgers and Oscar Hammerstein II to adapt into a Broadway musical (Willett 
2006a). According to C. Y. Lee, Rodgers and Hammerstein, already experienced in adapting books 
into romantic musicals, enjoyed working with “foreign material” and, having never done “Chinese 
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material” before, agreed to adapt The Flower Drum Song (Willett 2006a). The resulting Broadway 
production (1958) became a national phenomenon and commercial success, nominated for six 
Tony awards and winning one, with extended performances on national tours and in London (Kim 
2013, 1).  
 Universal Studios produced the similarly successful film version in 1961, which was 
nominated for five Academy awards and, according to Nancy Kwan and The Rodgers & 
Hammerstein Organization, also gained many Asian American fans (Kim 2013, 1; R&H n.d.; Wada 
2001, 70). The Broadway musical and film, which C. Y. Lee believes Rodgers and Hammerstein 
made funnier and more commercial than his novel, centers around a love quadrangle (Shin and 
Lee 2004, 85). In the film, Mei Li and her father arrive by boat in San Francisco, Chinatown as 
undocumented immigrants (name changes from the novel to the film are noted in Table 2, below). 
She is a picture bride for Celestial Gardens owner Sammy Fong, but because he is interested one 
of his dancers, Linda Low, he offers her as a bride for Wang Chi-yang’s son, Wang Ta. In the film, 
Madame Liang retains the role of pushing Wang Chi-yang towards assimilation, and she 
persuades him to let Mei Li and Wang Ta fall in love naturally. Meanwhile, since Sammy won’t 
commit to marrying Linda, Linda has been dating Wang Ta, and the two announce their 
engagement at a party in the Wang family residence, with Celestial Gardens host Frankie Wing 
standing in as her “brother.”  
Next, the conflicts of the mismatched love pairings come to a head. Sammy invites the 
Wangs to the Celestial Gardens to expose Linda Low as a dancing girl, driving Wang Ta to drink 
himself into a stupor and fall asleep in Helen Chao’s apartment. Mei Li discovers his jacket at 
Helen’s place, and distraught, she enforces her original marriage contract with the unwilling 
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Sammy. Wang Ta visits her before the wedding, and the two realize they love each other. At the 
wedding, Mei Li exposes herself as an illegal immigrant, voiding the original marriage contract 
and freeing herself to marry Wang Ta—and Linda to marry Sammy—in a double wedding. The 
overall plot of the Broadway musical differs only slightly from the film (Lubbock 1962).   
Table 2: The Cast of Flower Drum Song  
Name in Book (1957) Name in Adaptations Broadway (1958) and Film (1961) cast40 
May Li Mei Li  • Miyoshi Umeki (Broadway, film) 
o First-gen Japanese American 
Old Man Li Dr. Li  • Conrad Yama (Broadway) 
o Second-gen Japanese American 
• Kam Tong (film) 
o Native-born Chinese American 
Madam Tang Madame Liang • Juanita Hall (Broadway and film) 
o Native-born African American 
Wang Ta Wang Ta • Ed Kenney (Broadway) 
o Hawaii-born Hawaiian-Chinese and Swedish-
Irish American41  
• James Shigeta (film) 
o Hawaii-born Japanese American 
Wang Chi-Yang Wang Chi-Yang • Keye Luke (Broadway) 
o First-gen Chinese American 
• Benson Fong (film) 
o Native-born Chinese American 
Wang San Wang San  • Patrick Adiarte (Broadway and film) 
o First-gen Filipino American 
Linda Tung Linda Low  • Pat Suzuki (Broadway) 
o Second-gen Japanese American 
• Nancy Kwan (film) 
o First-gen English/Scottish and Chinese 
(Cantonese) American 
N/A Sammy Fong  • Larry Blyden (Broadway) 
o Native-born Jewish American 
                                                     
40 In this table, “first-gen” is used when the individual is an immigrant to their nation, “second-gen” is used 
when the parents of the individual are both known to be immigrants to the individual’s nation, while 
“native-born” is used when the parental status is mixed or unknown (which differs slightly from the way 
the Pew Research Center uses the terms, referenced in Chapter 1). This ethnicity and nationality 
information was obtained from Wikipedia profiles. Of the Japanese Americans, all but Umeki and Shigeta 
were interned during WWII.  
41 Hawaii remained a territory of the United States until 1959, but based on U.S. Code 1405, persons born 
in Hawaii on/after April 30, 1900 are citizens of the United States.  
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• Jack Soo (film)42 
o Native-born Japanese American 
Helen Chao Helen Chao • Arabella Hong (Broadway) 
o Native-born Chinese American 
• Reiko Sato (film) 
o Second-gen Japanese American 
N/A Frankie Wing • Jack Soo (Broadway) 
• Victor Sen Yung (film) 
o Second-gen Chinese American 
Table 2, above, lists the major cast members in the Broadway production and subsequent 
film (Koster 1961; Playbill n.d.). Both the Broadway musical and the film were the first of their 
kinds to have a mostly Asian American cast43 (Kim 2013, 1). Of the Broadway cast, only Larry 
Blyden and Juanita Hall44, were not Asian (R&H n.d.). Although the characters are all Chinese or 
Chinese American, the rest of the cast was drawn from a variety of Asian backgrounds, mostly 
Japanese American45 . The film starred, as The Rodgers & Hammerstein Organization put it, 
“almost every famous Asian-American face in Hollywood” (R&H n.d.). Miyoshi Umeki had already 
gained popularity for her role in Sayonara (1957) as the demure and ideal wife, Katsumi, and 
Nancy Kwan for her performance in The World of Suzie Wong (1960) film as the titular prostitute 
(R. G. Lee 1999, 175–76; Marchetti 1993, 120). These two actresses’ roles in Flower Drum Song 
                                                     
42 Jack Soo was formerly Jack Suzuki (renamed to have a more “Chinese”-sounding last name) (Willett 
2006c).  
43 Rodgers and Hammerstein and their director, Gene Kelly, aimed to cast Asian actors over white actors 
in yellowface, and they actively sought out Asian performers (R&H n.d.; Willett 2006c).  
44  African American actress Juanita Hall had previously played Bloody Mary in South Pacific (1949 
Broadway musical and 1958 film) (Kim 2013, 34). Originally, Anna May Wong was under contract to play 
Madame Liang in the film version, reflecting the creators’ goals to have an all-Asian cast, but she became 
ill and unfortunately died before filming could begin (Monji 2016; Bai 2018). 
45 Rodgers wrote in his autobiography: “The ethnically mixed cast certainly didn’t lessen the total effect; 
What was important was that the actors gave the illusion of being Chinese. This demonstrates one of the 
most wonderful things about theatre audiences. People want to believe what they see on a stage, and 
they will gladly go along with whatever is done to achieve the desired effect” (Rodgers 1975, 295). 
Embedded in his statement is the longstanding myth that race is visible, discussed in Chapter 1.  
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were influenced by their previous films. To illustrate, Nancy Kwan’s sultry and glamorous Linda 
Low in the film was a very different interpretation from Pat Suzuki’s klutzy version on Broadway46 
(Willett 2006a; R. G. Lee 1999, 175). The film’s promotional materials wielded Nancy Kwan’s 
commercial appeal to their advantage, featuring her image more often than Academy Award-
winning Umeki’s (R. G. Lee 1999, 176). The film also helped launch the careers of Asian American 
actors who were “discovered” in the casting process, like Jack Soo, who went on to became the 
first Asian American lead in a regular television series (Willett 2006c; Adachi 2009). In addition, 
Flower Drum Song helped cement James Shigeta, who had already starred in a number of films, 
as Hollywood’s first Asian romantic leading man since Sessue Hayakawa (Vallance 2014).  
Sociocultural and Production Contexts 
The novel, Broadway musical, and film came out during the post-World War II/Cold War 
era, concurrent with the start of the Civil Rights movement (1950s-60s) and immediately before 
the first Asian American movement gained traction (Chapter 1). The second wave feminist 
movement would soon begin in the 1960s-1970s, and the term “model minority” would be 
coined in 1966, coincident with immigration reforms that skewed the demographics of Asian 
America towards wealthier, educated immigrants (discussed in Chapter 1) (Burkett 2019; Hằng 
and Phùng 2018, 87). As Chapter 2 explains, this time period was dominated by narratives which 
aimed to situate the United States as a multicultural, ethnically assimilated nation, yet the main 
images of Asians as Orientalized and feminized—and later as model minorities—put strict 
boundaries around what kinds of assimilation were acceptable.  
                                                     
46 At the time of the film’s production, Pat Suzuki was seven months pregnant and, as she stated, “would 
have had some trouble playing a stripper” (Thomas 1963). 
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Placing Flower Drum Song in the context of the period’s Broadway shows helps 
demonstrate these shifting cultural negotiations. Before Flower Drum Song, Rodgers and 
Hammerstein had written two other book-to-musical adaptations which featured Orientalized 
backgrounds and characters: South Pacific (1949) and The King and I (1951). These three are 
commonly called the duo’s “Chopsticks Musicals,” and all were about romantic love overcoming 
cultural conflict (Kim 2013, 3; R. G. Lee 1999, 173). A reviewer from the New Yorker critiqued 
Rodgers and Hammerstein’s homogeneous treatment of Orientalized groups (R. G. Lee 1999, 
173). She pointed out that the exoticized portrayals of the native Pacific Islanders and Siamese in 
the earlier two musicals were once again recycled for the immigrant Chinese Americans of Flower 
Drum Song, despite clear differences in circumstances (R. G. Lee 1999, 173). While some of the 
character traits discussed by the reviewer did not necessarily originate from the duo (e.g. Mei 
Li’s unfamiliarity with kissing was adapted from the novel), the two certainly did transform the 
outspoken May Li of the book into a shy and naïve girl for the musical47 (Rodgers 1975, 295).  
The American setting of the musical is significant. The shift with Flower Drum Song from 
visiting exotic places to localizing and “Americanizing” the exotic was a reflection of the 
flourishing liberal multiculturalism which celebrated immigration and assimilation as essential to 
the American experience48 (S. S.-H. Lee 2014, 315). Other contemporaneous Broadway musicals 
shared the same impulse: West Side Story (1957) put an “ethnic” twist on Romeo and Juliet with 
two New York gangs—one white and the other Puerto Rican—taking the place of the Montagues 
                                                     
47 Mei Li’s childlike sweetness is reminiscent of Miyoshi Umeki’s previous role as Katsumi in Sayonara. 
Umeki was to be typecast yet again as the servile Asian female in her later role as Mrs. Livingston in the 
television series, The Courtship of Eddie’s Father (1969-1972). 
48 J. F. Kennedy’s A Nation of Immigrants was published in the same year that Flower Drum Song started 
playing (1958).  
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and Capulets; Fiddler on the Roof (1964) ends with a Jewish family fleeing to America to escape 
the anti-Semitic pogroms of pre-revolutionary Russia (S. S.-H. Lee 2014, 315).  
In the case of Flower Drum Song, the spectacle of the Broadway musical, with its 
carnivalesque singing and dancing, is particularly useful for promoting liberal multiculturalism 
because it provides a utopian escapism from racial discrimination49 (Kim 2013, 5). It did not have 
to depart from the existing musical conventions to do so. As Hammerstein told Newsweek, their 
goal in making Flower Drum Song was to create an entertaining show, and compared to their 
previous musicals (which had featured miscegenation, a suicide, or changes to the musical 
format), it “doesn’t break any new dramaturgical ground” (White 1958). New York Times 
reviewer Bosley Crowther noted that its characters and jokes are reminiscent of older comedic 
plays about white ethnic immigrants leaving the old world for the new one (Crowther 1961).  
Evolving Receptions 
 Upon their releases, the book, Broadway musical, and film achieved commercial success, 
as discussed earlier. Those involved in the creative process considered Flower Drum Song 
revolutionary for its Asian American cast and humane depictions of its Chinese American 
characters. C. Y. Lee was himself intimately acquainted with the lack of Chinese American 
representation. After showing the play he wrote for his final M.F.A. project, he was scouted by 
an agent who like his writing. She advised him to switch from playwriting to fiction because a 
Chinese American play which featured Chinese stories would never sell; there was no Broadway 
                                                     
49 Though the lengthy immigration and citizenship process are briefly mocked, and illegal immigration 
figures prominently in the film, the racialized aspect of these exclusions goes unexamined, and the 
barriers are ultimately overcome with little resistance through celebratory moments (the graduation party, 
the “Chop Suey” song, and the wedding). 
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precedent for it (Shin and Lee 2004, 87–88). In that production climate, the support of Joseph 
Fields and the cultural weight of Rodgers and Hammerstein were crucial to the development and 
success of Flower Drum Song. Their decision to use as many Asian actors as possible even resulted 
in the director of the musical, Gene Kelly, asking C. Y. Lee for help finding cast members50 (Shin 
and Lee 2004, 83; Willett 2006c; R&H n.d.). As for the cast, Nancy Kwan was excited that Asians 
were playing the Asian characters, Patrick Adiarte has reflected on the rarity of finding an 
“unaccented” Asian role like his, and James Shigeta has said that he was drawn to his part 
because it wasn’t a Western stereotype of the “Orientals”51 (Willett 2006c; Yardley 2017; Bai 
2018). The show at least appeared to be an improvement in Asian American representations 
when compared to the other Broadway show playing across the street: The World of Suzie Wong 
(1958), which was heavily criticized as clichéd52 and had to be changed from a tedious drama to 
a comedy to keep audiences from leaving mid-show (Haydon 2017).  
Reviewers from Boston Daily Record and Variety magazine who saw the Boston tryouts 
considered Flower Drum Song to be a hit and one of Rodgers and Hammerstein’s major works 
                                                     
50 C. Y. Lee’s participation in the production of the Broadway musical was largely limited to this function. 
He did not raise questions about Rodgers and Hammerstein’s changes, claiming that his familiarity with 
the difficulties of adapting a novel into a play caused his reticence (Shin and Lee 2004, 84–85). He has also 
said that he wanted to learn by watching Rodgers and Hammerstein during the tryout period, indicating 
that he respected their experience (Shin and Lee 2004, 82). For David Henry Hwang’s 2002 adaptation, he 
did offer one suggestion: to remove a scene in which refugees tear up Mao Ze Dong’s picture (Shin and 
Lee 2004, 80–81). 
51 That year, Shigeta also played the Japanese husband of a white American woman in Bridge to the Sun 
(1961). Though both roles did depart from typical representations of Asian males, they also contained 
other stereotypes of the model minority and the traditionalist Japanese foreigner, respectively. Some 
viewers thought Flower Drum Song’s stereotypes were less egregious than its contemporaries: David 
Henry Hwang, who had seen the movie, claimed that the characters in Flower Drum Song seemed like real 
people instead of inhumanly bad (Fu Manchu) or inhumanly good (Charlie Chan) (Willett 2006c). 
52 The “Asian prostitute,” for example, had already been played by Anna May Wong in multiple films by 
this point (Monji 2016). Interestingly, neither of the two quoted critiques were about the Asian prostitute 
specifically so much as about dusty clichés and the idealized prostitute figure in general.  
 60 
 
(White 1958). Other reviews of the show were mixed (Wada 2001, 70). Though the movie was 
deemed by Crowther as retaining the show’s strong points (“colorfulness and pleasant music”) 
and being alright in other aspects, it garnered more criticism from Variety magazine (Crowther 
1961). The magazine wrote, “the fundamental charm, grace, and novelty of [the Broadway hit] 
has been overwhelmed by the sheer opulence and glamour with which Ross Hunter has 
translated it to the screen. As a film, it emerges a curiously unaffecting, unstable and rather 
undistinguished experience” (Variety Staff 1960).  
During the first Asian American movement of the 1960s and 1970s, activists rejected 
Flower Drum Song—by then associated mostly with the show and film—as “inauthentic” 
primarily because it was created by non-Asians (C. Y. Lee [1957] 2002, xiv–xv). They felt that it 
both perpetuated Orientalist stereotypes of Asians and, as filmmaker Renee Tajima observed, 
gave rise to a new generation of model minority stereotypes (Hsing and Xing 1998, 63; Shin and 
Lee 2004, 77). When Asian American ethnic studies were being established, C. Y. Lee’s novel and 
his picture of the Chinese American experience were excluded from the literary canon (Shin and 
Lee 2004, 77–78). Playwright David Henry Hwang later attributed this omission to first, an 
inability to separate the novel from its association with the musical, and second, to “reverse-
snobbery,” which also condemned the novel as “inauthentic” for achieving marketplace success 
with white audiences (C. Y. Lee [1957] 2002, xv).  
In addition, there were a few critics who said the book itself was stereotypical and had a 
touristic quality53 (Shin and Lee 2004, 85; S. S.-H. Lee 2014, 260; C. Y. Lee [1957] 2002, xix). Lee 
                                                     
53 These criticisms of pandering to white audiences were also raised against Amy Tan’s The Joy Luck Club 
(1989) (Fickle 2014, 68). Christina Klein argues that this tourist-guide quality—also found in Pardee Lowe’s 
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contested the criticism about stereotypes, saying that his novels are an “accurate portrayal of 
people during the period [he] was writing about,” and Hwang claims that those critiques are 
based on superficial, overly simplistic readings (Shin and Lee 2004, 85; C. Y. Lee [1957] 2002, xix–
xx). Nevertheless, the novel soon went out of print, and the Broadway show was not revived 
(Shin and Lee 2004, 77; R&H n.d.). Most subsequent analyses have focused on the film, and many 
critics from the 1990s onwards consider the film indicative of a dominant United States desire to 
turn a previously foreignized Asian America into an ethnic commodity (Kim 2013, 4). They claim 
that the film promotes multiculturalism over ethnic essentialism and supports liberal, democratic 
capitalism over Soviet Union communism54 (Kim 2013, 4).  
In 2002, Hwang, best known for his play M. Butterfly (1988), brought a new adaptation of 
the Rodgers and Hammerstein musical to Broadway, reusing the original songs but changing the 
plot and tone (Shin and Lee 2004, 77). His goal was to shift the perspective of the musical from 
the original’s “tourist’s-eye-view” 55  to a point of view coming from within the Chinatown 
community (Willett 2006c). As a result of his initiatives, interest in both Lee’s novel and the film 
were reignited. The book was reissued in 2002 with a new introduction from Hwang56, and a DVD 
                                                     
Father and Glorious Descent (1943) and Jade Snow Wong’s Fifth Chinese Daughter (1950)—countered 
earlier images of Chinatown as either exotic or socially degraded places (Klein 2003, 175–76).  
54 These analyses, especially Robert G. Lee’s, have greatly informed the contents of this thesis.  
55 He uses the lyrics of the song, “Grant Avenue,” as an example: “You travel there in a trolley. In a trolley 
up you climb” (Willett 2006a). The lyrics appear to be directed at an audience from outside Chinatown. 
Indeed, the only white people in the movie, besides the robber, are tourist-like audience members viewing 
the performances in Celestial Gardens. 
56 C. Y. Lee passed away on November 8, 2018 at the age of 102 (Seelye 2019). Because of the renewed 
interest in his work, Lee’s story has fortunately been preserved in many interviews and recordings from 
the early 2000s.  
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version of the film was released in 2006 with additional special features57 (Shin and Lee 2004, 78). 
To bring this revival to the stage, Hwang tested reactions to the idea of a new Flower Drum Song, 
and he found that critical attitudes towards the film have softened since the 1970s and 80s 
protests in which he participated (Wada 2001, 74). Currently, Rodgers and Hammerstein are 
generally praised for opening doors for Asian American talent while criticized for exoticizing Asian 
America58 (Wada 2001, 72–74; Willett 2006c).  
2. Crazy Rich Asians 
Novel 
In 1973, Kevin Kwan was born in Singapore to an old and established Chinese family59 and 
moved to Houston, Texas at the age of 11 (Jose 2018; Christensen 2013; Chiu 2018). Though he 
doesn’t describe his life in Singapore as particularly lavish or ostentatious (the family’s old money 
was mostly gone by the time he was born), upon his move to American suburbia, he began to 
realize the quiet luxury of his paternal grandparents’ home and lifestyle, the wealth of his friends’ 
families, and the prominence of the people he met through his journalist aunt (Jose 2018; Gross 
2018). Many years later, in 2009, his father was diagnosed with cancer (Jose 2018). During their 
                                                     
57 Laurence Maslon, theatre and film historian, made a statement in the DVD special features that praised 
the same touristic quality of the musical that Hwang and critics found issue with: “Great musicals, whether 
they’re stage or film, take you on a journey to someplace you’ve never been...You get to enter a world 
that a very small group of people ever have entered, which is Chinatown in San Francisco. So, Rodgers and 
Hammerstein, working with Joseph Fields, have given us an entrée…into this world, that if we went to San 
Francisco, we wouldn’t be a part of” (Willett 2006a). In his description of Chinatown as a secluded travel 
destination and exclusive community, he reveals the persistence of the tendency to foreignize Asian 
people and communities within America. 
58 The MANAA (Media Action Network for Asian Americans) video guide, for example, describes the film 
as an unrealistic depiction of 1960s Chinatown. However, the guide also recognizes the film’s place as one 
of the only Hollywood productions with an almost all-Asian cast and recommends seeing it to enjoy the 
veteran Asian American talent (Payne 1998). 
59 Incidentally, one of Kevin Kwan’s cousins is actress Nancy Kwan (Bai 2018; Gross 2018). 
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drives to chemotherapy appointments, the two would reminisce about their time in Singapore 
(Jose 2018; Chiu 2018). Following his father’s death in 2010, Kwan began writing a novel as a way 
to preserve their shared memories (Kwan 2018). That novel would become Crazy Rich Asians 
(2013), which went on to be an international bestseller (Sun and Ford 2018).   
In the book, Rachel Chu, an economics professor at NYU, has been raised in America by 
her single mother, Kerry Chu. Her boyfriend, fellow history professor Nick Young, invites her to 
his home country of Singapore where he will be the best man at Colin Khoo and Araminta Lee’s 
wedding. In Singapore, Rachel finds out from her friend, Goh Peik Lin, that Colin and Araminta 
are part of extremely wealthy families. Though no one in Peik Lin’s family has heard of Nick, upon 
arriving at the ancestral estate of Nick’s paternal grandmother (Shang Su Yi), they discover that 
the tabloid-shy Young family is old-money rich.  
Meanwhile, Nick’s mother, Eleanor Young, and the other upper crust families of 
Singapore find out about Rachel. Egged on by her prestige-obsessed friends, Eleanor digs into 
Rachel’s background. She disapproves of Rachel and wants Nick to marry a girl from their social 
circles who would be accepted by the extended Young family. Her concern partially stems from 
the past: Eleanor herself experienced disapproval from Shang Su Yi, and she decided to let Su Yi 
raise Nick so that he would have a better chance of inheriting the estate. Many of these wealthy 
families view Rachel as a gold-digger, and their socialite daughters bully her at Araminta’s 
bachelorette party and wedding. Nick decides to propose to Rachel to prove his love for her, but 
his plan is intercepted by his mother and grandmother, who reveal to Rachel that Kerry’s ex-
husband, Fang Min, is alive and in jail. An upset Rachel plans to fly to China to meet him, but Nick 
brings Kerry to Singapore so that the mother and daughter can talk. Kerry reveals to Rachel that 
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her ex-husband had abused her, and she fell in love with another man, Kao Wei, who is Rachel’s 
real father. The book ends with Rachel’s reconciliation with her mother and with Nick.    
At the same time as Rachel and Nick’s story unfolds, Nick’s cousin, Astrid Teo (née Leong), 
sees her marriage to Michael Teo fall apart. Michael, an entrepreneur at a tech startup, is 
unhappy with the extreme wealth disparity between Astrid and himself, and he feels rejected by 
Astrid’s family for his lack of pedigree. He tricks her into believing he is having an affair, but 
Astrid’s old boyfriend, Charlie Wu, helps her track him down. Michael reveals his pretense and 
tells Astrid he wants to leave her because he doesn’t want to stand in the way of her relationship 
with her family. Because Astrid still loves Michael, Charlie arranges to acquire Michael’s company 
and vest him with stock options to increase his net worth, in the hopes of making Astrid happy.  
Kevin Kwan has been extensively interviewed about his inspirations for the novel. He 
initially intended to write a “dark story” about the obscene and ridiculous wealth disparity in 
Singapore, but the novel eventually became a social satire (Kwan 2018)60. Elements of the book 
such as the rich, upper class Singaporean society and politics of the extended family were loosely 
drawn from his childhood in Singapore (Christensen 2013). However, Kwan has said that his own 
family is not “crazy rich” when compared to the characters in his novel (Kwan 2018). Some of the 
experiences he draws on also came after his move to the United States, when he witnessed rapid 
increases in wealth each time he visited Hong Kong (Kwan 2018). He claims that he even had to 
“tone down” the excessive decadence that he witnessed because his editor found those details 
too unbelievable for readers (Christensen 2013).  
                                                     
60 The interview cited here was from an event, A Conversation with Kevin Kwan, at The Long Center for 
Performing Arts in Austin, Texas. Journalist and author Jeff Yang (father of Fresh Off the Boat’s Hudson 
Yang) acted as the moderator/interviewer. 
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Kwan unabashedly owns the voyeuristic nature of his novel, considering it an 
unprecedented Asian perspective on the lives of the wealthy elite, a topic which commonly 
features European or American aristocrats and socialites (e.g. Downton Abbey (2010-2015)) 
(Christensen 2013). He explains that his goal in writing the novel was to “introduce a 
contemporary Asia to a North American audience,” and the novel was not aimed at Singaporean 
audiences (Govani 2015). Kwan considers the setting in Asia fundamental to his story because he 
believes the rapid accumulation of wealth in China has created a sudden rise in new billionaires 
and fortunes which have affected the “old-money” families of Singapore, Hong Kong, Indonesia, 
and the Philippines61 (Christensen 2013).  
Regarding the book’s contents, Kwan has called it a family drama that examines the 
complexity of family relationships as well as a generational and cultural divide (Christensen 2013). 
According to Kwan, the struggle is between the older generations with their traditional Chinese 
family values and the Westernized, younger generations who don’t believe or know those rules62 
                                                     
61 In light of the film version, Andrew Liu analyzes the wealth accumulation in Singapore in an article 
published in n+1 magazine (Liu 2018). After providing a history of Singapore’s economic development, he 
notes conflicts between modern economics (represented by Rachel) and landed wealth (represented by 
Eleanor). He finds additional conflict between the different forms of historical wealth accumulation that 
have resulted in diasporic labor divisions. He also asserts that the 20th century capitalist development of 
Singapore, which has led to both economic growth and widening inequality, repeats the patterns of 
Western Europe and North America in the preceding century. However, partly because of their positions 
as post-colonial subjects (or in China’s case, because of colonial-like interferences), Asian countries’ 
economic development is framed as “catching up” to the North Atlantic. Thus, when the Asian diasporic 
creators of Crazy Rich Asians aimed for power and mainstream representations in Hollywood, they 
created a film which tenuously balances between a) the struggles for legitimacy amongst Asian capital 
(and diaspora) and b) the North Atlantic’s modern “Yellow Peril” fears of Asian investment and economic 
forces.  
62 Kwan uses the example of his character Nick Young, who was born in Singapore but absorbed “Western” 
values from his education in Britain (Christensen 2013). However, within the book, the divide is not nearly 
so simplistic: though Shang Su Yi derides the Westernization of her son and grandson, Rachel notices that 
the grandmother’s home and lifestyle have been heavily influenced by British practices (Kwan 2013, 336). 
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(Christensen 2013). Kwan thinks that his novel celebrates not only the wealth of Singapore, but 
the rich cultural lives and exquisite taste of (some of) its residents (Christensen 2013).  
Film Adaptation 
The plot of the film roughly follows that of the novel, with more of a focus on Rachel and 
Nick’s storyline than Astrid and Michael’s. The main difference is in the ending: after Kerry shares 
her story with Rachel, Rachel meets up with Nick. He proposes to her, but she turns him down. 
She invites Eleanor to play a game of mahjong, and during the game, she reveals that she has 
sacrificed her future with Nick so that he can be happy and stay connected to his family. As she 
and Kerry board a flight home, Nick follows them onto the plane and proposes to Rachel with his 
mother’s ring. They stay another night in Singapore for their engagement party.  
Astrid’s ending is also altered. Instead of reconnecting with Charlie (except in a brief mid-
credits scene) and finding out that Michael’s affair is fake, she confronts Michael as he packs to 
leave their shared apartment. Astrid tells him that she will be the one moving out. She then says 
that it was his cowardice and not her family’s money that ended their relationship. With both 
changes, the film gives greater autonomy and strength of character to its women.  
Before the book was even released, Kevin Kwan was already being approached for its 
adaptation rights, and soon after, he met with various interested producers to sift through their 
pitches (Chris Lee 2018). Many of them, he said, were seeking to break into the Chinese market63, 
a desire heightened by the then-recent Chinese box office success of another movie about rich 
Chinese families, Tiny Times (2013) (Sun and Ford 2018; Kwan 2018). Ultimately, Kwan selected 
                                                     
63 Hollywood has become increasingly dependent on Asian investment for its productions, and global 
audiences for its profits (Ho 2018). 
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Nina Jacobson and Brad Simpson from Color Force to produce the film (Sun and Ford 2018). The 
reason for his selection was that the pair had a track record of adapting books into films (e.g. The 
Hunger Games and Diary of a Wimpy Kid franchises), they were the only producers who focused 
on doing justice to the story over using the film to enter the Chinese market, and they were the 
only ones who had read the book64 (Kwan 2018).  
Kwan optioned the film for $1 (with further compensation as the project was made) in 
exchange for continued involvement in the decision making processes (Sun and Ford 2018; Chris 
Lee 2018). The team selected Ivanhoe Pictures as their financing partner, whose branches in 
Hong Kong and Singapore would facilitate the filming process (Chris Lee 2018). The Los Angeles-
based company specialized in “Asian-focused content” for China, indicating that, despite Kwan’s 
stated reasons for selecting Color Force, the team still wanted success in the Chinese cinematic 
marketplace (Sun and Ford 2018; Chris Lee 2018).  
In 2016, Jon M. Chu, influenced by Twitter’s anti-whitewashing movement (discussed 
later), was looking to make a film related to his Asian American cultural identity (Chris Lee 2018; 
Guerrasio 2018). After he was brought on as the director of Crazy Rich Asians, he made a few 
adjustments to get his dream cast, which included not just Asian Americans, but international 
Asian stars (a portion of the cast is listed in Table 3, below) (Sun and Ford 2018). First, production 
was pushed back to accommodate Constance Wu’s availability (Sun and Ford 2018). Second, 
writer Adele Lim was brought on to add cultural specificity and emotional authenticity to Peter 
Chiarelli’s screenplay (Sun and Ford 2018). Her addition was in response to Michelle Yeoh’s 
                                                     
64  Wendi Deng, who had also read and enjoyed the book, was the first to approach Kwan for the 
adaptation rights (Sun and Ford 2018). Her vision for the film was perfectly in line with his, but timing 
issues prevented them from proceeding on the project together (Sun and Ford 2018). 
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request that her character Eleanor be more than a tiger mom stereotype (Sun and Ford 2018). 
Yeoh was not alone in providing input for the film. In making Crazy Rich Asians, Jon M. Chu was 
actively invested in avoiding cultural clichés, using Kwan, the cast, and the crew as on-set experts 
for lifestyle and culture (Chris Lee 2018; Ho 2018). Together, they worked to get the details right, 
from the fashion and jewelry to the food and language, and Chu even hired a mahjong expert to 
choreograph the climactic scene between Rachel and Eleanor (Ho 2018). 
Table 3: The Cast of Crazy Rich Asians 
Character Name Film Cast Ethnicity and Nationality of Cast65  
Rachel Chu Constance Wu Second-gen Taiwanese American 
Kerry Chu Tan Kheng Hua Native-born Chinese (Teochew & Hokkien) Singaporean66 
Nick Young Henry Golding Native-born Iban and English Malaysian  
Eleanor Young Michelle Yeoh Native-born Chinese (Hokkien) Malaysian  
Ah Ma (Shang Su Yi) Lisa Lu First-gen Chinese American 
Astrid Young Teo Gemma Chan Second-gen Chinese British 
Michael Teo Pierre Png Native-born Peranakan Singaporean 
Peik Lin Goh Awkwafina Native-born Chinese and Korean American 
Wye Mun Goh Ken Jeong Second-gen Korean American 
Neenah Goh Koh Chieng Mun  Native-born Singaporean 
P.T. Goh Calvin Wong Native-born Malaysian67 
Oliver T’sien Nico Santos First-gen Filipino American 
Araminta Lee Sonoya Mizuno First-gen Japanese and English/Argentinian British 
Colin Khoo Chris Pang Native-born Chinese Australian 
Bernard Tai Jimmy O. Yang First-gen Chinese American 
Eddie Cheng Ronny Chieng Native-born Chinese Malaysian  
Fiona Cheng Victoria Loke Native-born Singaporean 
Alistair Cheng Remy Hii Native-born Chinese-Malaysian and English Australian 
Kitty Pong Fiona Xie Native-born Singaporean 
Amanda Ling Jing Lusi First-gen Chinese British 
Alix Young Selena Tan Native-born Singaporean 
Felicity Young Janice Koh Native-born Singaporean 
                                                     
65 This ethnicity and nationality information was obtained primarily from Wikipedia and IMDb profiles. 
Some ethnicity information has not been disclosed, and many listed nationalities are reductive (an 
individual might have been born, raised, educated, and working in different countries). Ronny Chieng, for 
example, was born in Malaysia, raised in the United States and Singapore, and educated in Australia. This 
oversimplification is also present in Table 2.  
66 From a Medium article (Bui 2018).  
67 From Geek & Sundry (Gaviola 2018). 
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The cast of the movie had an assortment of experiences when making the film. Several 
have been involved in projects where they were one of the few Asians on set, including Gemma 
Chan, Awkwafina, Ken Jeong, Jimmy O. Yang, and Nico Santos. These individuals have expressed 
the joys of working on a project with many other Asian cast members (Chris Lee 2018; Sun and 
Ford 2018). Ronny Chieng has commented on the rarity of Hollywood roles which ask for 
characters with Malaysian accents like his (Sun and Ford 2018). Self-identified “international 
actress” Tan Kheng Hua has had most of her career in Singapore, where she says multiracial 
Asian-cast shows and films are commonplace, and “diversity” isn’t a term used in their marketing 
(Bui 2018). She finds that labels like “immigrant” and “Asian American” over-define their 
respective categories, which can become limiting (Bui 2018). However, she understands that 
Asian American actors have had very different experiences than hers, and that the racial politics 
of the United States begets the use of these labels (Bui 2018).  
The film also introduced several acting newcomers, most notably former-BBC travel 
correspondent, Henry Golding68 (Chris Lee 2018). After his casting, Golding’s biracial identity 
provoked some backlash (Sun and Ford 2018). In response to criticisms that he is “not Asian 
enough” to play Nick, Golding pointed out the contradictions in Asian profiling practices, since he 
had spent his childhood in Malaysia and had always been labeled as Asian during his time in 
Britain (Sun and Ford 2018). The variety of interpretations that this global cast has made of their 
experiences is symptomatic of the film’s transnational contexts, which also play a role in its 
reception, discussed later. 
                                                     
68 Crazy Rich Asians has launched Golding’s acting career. He has also starred in A Simple Favor (2018) and 
the soon-to-be-released Last Christmas (2019), Monsoon (2019), and The Gentlemen (2020) (Amsden 
2019). 
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When it was time to choose a distributor for the film, Jon M. Chu and Kevin Kwan 
narrowed their options down to two contenders: Netflix and Warner Bros. (Sun and Ford 2018). 
Netflix offered complete artistic freedom, a greater upfront payment, and a guarantee that all of 
Kwan’s books in the Crazy Rich Asians trilogy would be turned into movies (Sun and Ford 2018). 
Despite Netflix’s better financial offer, Kwan and Chu chose Warner Bros. because it provided the 
high-profile of a major Hollywood studio, a wide-reaching theatrical release, and public proof of 
the film’s performance (Sun and Ford 2018). Additionally, audiences would have to make a 
greater effort to see the film in theatres, so Chu felt that their choice was a way to validate to 
Asian American audiences that they are worth that extra effort (Chris Lee 2018).  
Their decision was ultimately a gamble: if the film succeeded at the box office (which 
romantic comedies had been struggling to do in the preceding years), it could open the doors to 
more opportunities for onscreen diversity; if it failed, there was a chance that studios would 
decide not to pursue other Asian-led films (Sun and Ford 2018; Chris Lee 2018). Of course, 
because Asian Americans only make up a small percentage of the U.S. population, the film could 
not rely on them alone for views: it would also have to appeal to wide audiences and ideally to 
international markets (Sun and Ford 2018). This pressure to succeed stemmed primarily from the 
film’s place as the first Hollywood studio movie with an all-Asian cast to be released in the 25 
years since Joy Luck Club (1993), a fact also used in much of the film’s promotion (Wang 2018). 
Sociocultural and Production Contexts 
Fresh Off the Boat: Narrowcasting and Constance Wu’s Breakout Performance 
Pre-1980s, three broadcast networks (ABC, NBC, and CBS) dominated television and 
aimed to create broadly appealing shows for the masses (Marx and Sienkiewicz 2018, 9). Since 
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then, cable and streaming networks have fragmented audiences by creating shows aimed at 
more “niche,” previously ignored viewers (Marx and Sienkiewicz 2018, 9, 122). This 
“narrowcasting” in the post-network era, paired with the widespread adoption of the internet 
and the emergence of user-generated content, has allowed audiences to access media 
entertainment on their own terms (Marx and Sienkiewicz 2018, 9). The United States has also 
seen a recent popularization of discourse about race and identity politics (Marx and Sienkiewicz 
2018, 196). Simultaneously, YouTube (one of the digital platforms where users can post their own 
media content) has contributed to the increase in Asian American representation by giving voice 
and bringing fame to content-creators like Ryan Higa, Kevin Wu, and Michelle Phan (Hằng and 
Phùng 2018, 89).  
As all these factors converged, a shift occurred within the major American broadcast 
networks. Competing for the increasingly divided attention of audiences with access to 
alternative and more representational forms of entertainment, the networks have increased 
“color-blind” and “multicultural” hiring practices in both the writer’s room and onscreen, as well 
as the number of shows featuring a “mostly non-white cast” or “non-white actors as co-leads” 
(Hằng and Phùng 2018, 89; Marx and Sienkiewicz 2018, 183). Out of these contexts emerged 
ABC’s family sitcom, Fresh Off the Boat (2015-present), based on chef Eddie Huang’s memoir by 
the same name (2013). Centered around the lives of a Taiwanese American family that moves to 
Orlando, Florida, the show stars an Asian American cast, the first to do so in the 20 years after 
Margaret Cho’s All-American Girl (1994-1995), and the first to achieve syndication status (Hằng 
and Phùng 2018, 89, 94; Huang 2019).  
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Although the show embodies the model minority stereotype, Hằng and Phùng argue that 
it has a “realistic and humane” touch: that is, the specific details about events, characters, 
environments, and Taiwanese American life69 break the show away from the all-(mainstream 
white)-American or all-Asian dichotomy that All-American Girl and Flower Drum Song both 
demonstrate (Hằng and Phùng 2018, 96, 99). Thus, the show feels “authentic” when it’s not (it 
diverges significantly from Eddie Huang’s memoir), and it tells a “relatable” story from an Asian 
American perspective (Hằng and Phùng 2018, 97). According to show creator Nahnatchka Khan, 
Fresh Off the Boat and Black-ish (2014-present) signal television comedy’s re-embracement of 
discussions about race, which had been largely absent following the end of Norman Lear’s 1970s 
shows (O’Connell 2019). In response to the 2016 election of the anti-immigration Trump 
administration, Fresh Off the Boat, already experienced in dealing with controversial topics, 
featured a season arc about the mother of the family, Taiwanese immigrant Jessica Huang, 
obtaining her American citizenship (O’Connell 2019). 
In the show, Constance Wu plays the unapologetically confident, funny, and sometimes 
vulnerable Jessica (Zhang 2015). Her time working on Fresh Off the Boat gave Wu experiences 
which would later influence her involvement with Crazy Rich Asians. First, she gained the 
confidence to advocate for changes to the projects she works on (Zhang 2015). Second, because 
Fresh Off the Boat broke the “drought” in shows featuring Asian American casts, she has already 
had to deal with the burden of representation and address challenging questions about 
portraying Asian Americans. For example, though Jessica seems to play out certain stereotypes, 
                                                     
69 For example, the show uses Chinese stink tofu instead of a more generic “Asian” dish (Hằng and Phùng 
2018, 97) 
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with a “tiger mom” parenting style and an accent faked by Wu, Wu asserts that the alternative 
to portraying Jessica this way—dodging the stereotypes—does not fix issues of representation 
(Zhang 2015). Instead, she says that stereotyped characters, instead of being the butt of jokes, 
should become the centers of the show or movie, with all their specificities and motivations, so 
that audiences learn the characters’ whole story and the dehumanizing power of the stereotype 
is removed (Wang 2018; Feeney 2015; Jones 2017). “Specificity” is Wu’s favorite path for 
constructing Asian American representations. She claims that it is not the antithesis of relatability; 
instead, it lends authenticity to stories and gives them greater “universal” appeal than trying to 
satisfy everyone (Feeney 2015; Zhang 2015).  
The third effect of working on Fresh Off the Boat was that Wu’s attention was drawn to 
issues of Asian American representation (Hess 2018). Her accompanying fame afforded her the 
platform upon which she could become a visible advocate for change in Hollywood (Wong 2018). 
On Twitter, in interviews, and on panels, Wu has spoken out about systemic issues within 
Hollywood such as whitewashing practices, color-blind casting, and sexual misconduct (Sun 
2018a; Wong 2018). She states that she has lost roles and turned down others in service of her 
goals to support Asian American communities (Sun 2016; Wong 2018). 
Altogether, the cumulative cultural weight and experience of Wu as both a star and an 
advocate allowed her ask Jon M. Chu to change the production schedule and script of Crazy Rich 
Asians70. Her advocacy also lends credence to the director’s assertion that the film is “not a movie, 
                                                     
70  Constance Wu suggested removing dialogue from the screenplay (originating in the book) which 
reaffirmed the stereotype of the undatable Asian man (Sun and Ford 2018). In the novel, Rachel asserts 
that she has a “no Asian guys” dating policy, but Wu stated that allowing Nick to be the exception to the 
rule only reaffirms that rule, and she didn’t want to dignify the policy by including it in the movie (Kwan 
2013, 87–92; Nordine 2018). 
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it’s a movement” (Christina Lee 2018). In response to backlash stemming from “impossibly high” 
standards (e.g. that the film, focusing on stars of East Asian descent, does not adequately 
represent Singapore’s demographics), Wu recycled the arguments she honed while defending 
Fresh Off the Boat71. That is, she understands the desire people have to see themselves onscreen, 
but no one film or show can address the entirety of a non-monolithic Asian America (Feeney 2015; 
Wang 2018; Tran 2018; De Souza 2018). Instead, she sees Crazy Rich Asians and Fresh Off the 
Boat as starting points from which more stories about different Asian American experiences can 
be told (Zhang 2015; Wang 2018; De Souza 2018).  
Wu’s situation can be placed within the histories of Asian American media creators, 
introduced in Chapter 1. In the 1980s, Asian American feature filmmaking was made possible by 
the critical mass of Asian American actors, bankable cultural properties, and writers that grew 
out of the 1960s and 1970s Asian American movement and independent film scene (Tajima 1991, 
28). Those films, however, were typically either a) feature films limited to art house circuits or b) 
documentaries which, as part of PBS’s “multicultural education” programming, were separated 
from mainstream entertainment (Tajima 1991, 24, 28). Building on those foundations, Wu’s 
journey is thus indicative of the continued growth in the cultural and economic power of Asian 
American talent and creators. They have formed a new critical mass that allows them to both 
draw investment from, and become incorporated into, the mainstream industry (Liu 2018).  
  
                                                     
71 Wu did not invent these arguments, but rather follows in and adds to the tradition of other writers, 
scholars, and advocates. For example, she borrows author Viet Thanh Nguyen’s idea of “narrative 
plentitude” to argue for opportunities to tell many different Asian American stories so that, in the future, 
a single movie no longer has to bear the burden of representation (Nguyen 2018; Ho 2018). 
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Activism Around Representation in Hollywood  
  In 2015, April Reign started the #OscarsSoWhite Twitter hashtag to point out the absence 
of Academy Award nominations for nonwhite lead or supporting actors (Reign 2018). Despite this 
call for greater diversity, at the next year’s Academy Awards telecast, Chris Rock made three 
Asian American children the butt of a model minority joke on stage (Hess 2018). The Asian 
American Hollywood community quickly organized against the jokes, and the remainder of 2016 
saw the flourishing of activism surrounding Asian American representation (Hess 2018). The list 
of prominent Asians and Asian Americans involved is extensive, including Constance Wu, Daniel 
Dae Kim, Kumail Nanjiani, Ming-Na Wen, Aziz Ansari, BD Wong, Margaret Cho, George Takei, 
Sandra Oh, director Ang Lee, and producer Janet Yang (Hess 2018). One of the main issues 
addressed was a lack of Asian American visibility in media, and a series of Twitter hashtags were 
made: #WhiteWashedOut, #StarringJohnCho, and #StarringConstanceWu (Hess 2018). The first 
one, created by Ellen Oh, protested “whitewashing,” a term newly-associated with the casting of 
white actors in prominent roles which, for one reason or another, are deemed more appropriate 
for Asian actors72 (Hess 2018). The latter two were the work of William Yu, who photoshopped 
John Cho and Constance Wu into movie posters to reimagine Asian Americans as the stars of 
popular films (Hess 2018).  
As a result of the mass outcry, the year 2017 saw many of the Hollywood stars implicated 
in whitewashing practices—Scarlett Johansson, Matt Damon, Hank Azaria, and Ed Skrein—held 
accountable and publicly responding to the criticisms (T. G. Lee 2017). Though the first three’s 
comments have skirted the issue, Skrein, as discussed in Chapter 2, gave up his role (T. G. Lee 
                                                     
72 Whitewashing and its predecessor, yellow face, are discussed more extensively in Chapter 2.  
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2017; Couch 2017). This movement has been part of the general emergence of “watchdog groups” 
which identify and challenge examples of underrepresentation and stereotyping in popular 
media (Marx and Sienkiewicz 2018, 197). Facing the threat of boycotts if their project is among 
the offending, producers have turned to blind-casting practices which create and cast roles 
without an explicit regard for race (Marx and Sienkiewicz 2018, 197). While this mode of casting 
increases visible, onscreen diversity, by ignoring racially and ethnically specific topics, it fails to 
engage with marginalized experiences or to increase the diversity of the stories represented 
(Marx and Sienkiewicz 2018, 197). Thus, while activism around representation has produced 
some positive results, it has also exacerbated other issues. With regards to Crazy Rich Asians 
specifically, the activism created a beneficial production climate in which the film could be made. 
When Kevin Kwan was approached for adaptation rights in 2013, one producer had asked to 
make Rachel Chu white instead of Chinese American (Chris Lee 2018). However, by the time the 
film started production, anti-whitewashing movements had essentially guaranteed Rachel Chu’s 
Chinese American identity (Kwan 2018). 
Reception 
 The earliest fans of Kevin Kwan’s novel were from New York’s fashion industry, media 
industry, and upper east side, spreading quickly to young white women in their 20s and 30s (Chiu 
2018; R. Chan and Yin 2018). Kwan postulates that Asian Americans, not a large segment of this 
mix, were initially suspicious of the book because of its racialized title (Chiu 2018). Only later did 
the film gain widespread support from Asian Americans (Chiu 2018). For the movie, Warner Bros. 
aimed to change this adoption pattern and “give the Asian American community ownership of 
the film” (Sun 2018b). Therefore, though the film maintained the broad appeal of a romantic 
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comedy, the marketing campaign was heavily targeted at the Asian American demographic (Sun 
2018b; R. Chan and Yin 2018). Early screenings were held for Asian American artists and 
influencers, which turned many of these viewers into ambassadors for the film (Sun 2018b). In 
addition, the promotional strategies focused on tying the film to a greater purpose: making 
Hollywood value diverse storytelling (R. Chan and Yin 2018). By the time the film was released in 
North America, the Asian demographic, interested in the film and heavily invested in its success, 
drove 38% of first-weekend sales, despite being only 13% of the North American population (Sun 
2018b). Overall, the $30 million budget film was commercially successful, grossing $174 million 
domestically and $238 million worldwide73 (Sun 2018b; Box Office Mojo 2019). The top grossing 
countries or regions are listed in Table 4, below (Box Office Mojo 2019). 
Table 4: Total Box Office Gross by Country 
Country/Region Total Gross (millions, rounded) 
Domestic $174.5 
Australia $17.4 
United Kingdom $7.4 
Indonesia $5.5 
New Zealand $2.3 
Taiwan $2.1 
Hong Kong $2.0 
China $1.7 
Next to the United States (which had a gross box office revenue of $11.08 billion in 2019), 
China has the biggest film market worldwide ($9.15 billion) (Statista 2019a). Compared to the 
total potential market, the film fared poorly in China, making only $1.65 million total and 
disappointing the hopes of the film’s production and distribution teams. One theory for China’s 
low numbers is that, because the film was released in the country three months after it came out 
                                                     
73 The film was also nominated for two Golden Globes and several other awards (Chu 2018).  
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in the rest of the world, many potential audience members had already seen the film either 
abroad or pirated online (Frater and Davis 2018). Nina Jacobson also postulates that the large 
discrepancy between the turnouts in the American and Chinese markets was caused by the 
different film landscapes. That is, in the United States, a big driver of audience attendance was a 
desire to see Asian and Asian American characters in Hollywood, but in China, the desire to see 
Chinese characters onscreen is already largely met by the country’s domestic film industry 
(Gardner 2018). Overall, global responses to the film were a mix of praise for the depiction of 
Asian American experiences and criticism for the inaccurate or stereotyped portrayals of 
Singapore and its residents.74 
Amid the successes of Crazy Rich Asians and Netflix’s To All the Boys I’ve Loved Before 
(2018) (another Asian American romantic comedy that was released two days later), there was a 
slew of announcements for the development of broadcast-network shows featuring Asian 
American-specific stories75 and leads, including Daniel Dae Kim’s Exhibit A, Warren Hsu Leonard’s 
                                                     
74 American Cary Chow praises the film for how it handles “Asian American topics” like food, superstitions, 
Asian male emasculation, and dual cultural identity, while still dealing with universal themes (Chow 2018). 
Though American radio journalist Stephanie Foo recognizes the rich people entitlement and American 
entitlement in the film, she was still moved by its depiction of an Asian American experience that she can 
relate to (Foo 2018). She thinks a little entitlement is warranted for those who have struggled with their 
Asian American identities, a narrative which had been mostly invisible to mainstream Hollywood during 
her youth (Foo 2018). Her Singaporean aunt, however, criticizes the materialism of the movie (Foo 2018). 
Along those lines, Pakistani writer Fatima Bhutto critiques the film for its lack of South Asian 
representation and its capitalist fantasy of unbridled wealth during a time of rising inequality both in 
Singapore and worldwide (Bhutto 2018). Singaporeans Kirsten Han and Pooja Nansi also point out that 
Crazy Rich Asians fails to represent Singapore’s diversity, relegating most of the cast members who are of 
non-East Asian descent to positions of servitude (Nansi 2018; Han 2018). Singaporeans Li Sian Goh and 
Ruby Thiagarajan add to these critiques, stating that the film exoticizes Singapore as an ultra-modern 
cosmopolitan city, erases indigenous and pre-colonial histories, and perpetuates systemic, colonialist 
racism that privileges the country’s Chinese-majority population (Goh 2018; Thiagarajan 2018).  
75 The reason I call these stories “Asian American-specific” is because the settings or narratives have been 
explicitly tied to their characters’ ethnicities, and the lead casts would almost certainly have to be Asian 
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Ohana, and Lisa Takeuchi Cullen’s Kung Fu (Press 2019). While none of the previously listed 
dramas have made it to series, there are a few comedies that have either already been ordered 
or are still in the running: Jason Kim and Greta Lee’s KTown, Jessica Gao’s show currently 
nicknamed “Lazy Rich Asians,” Hannah Simone’s still untitled show, Kevin Kwan’s The Emperor of 
Malibu, and Awkwafina’s Comedy Central series (Press 2019). That comedy is the preferred genre 
is no surprise: as mentioned in Chapter 1, its broad appeal and relative inexpensiveness makes it 
both an ideal site for experimentation and a locale from which marginalized people and ideas can 
enter the mainstream (Press 2019).  
Though the idea that these Asian American shows are experiments belittles both their 
creators and the growing list of existing Asian-led shows in America76, they do seem to be arriving 
during a time of transition, not just for the networks, but also for the creators themselves. Cullen 
and Leonard, for example, have indicated that even just a few years ago, they would have been 
discouraged from or afraid to pitch such shows (Press 2019). Sue Naegle said that she would have 
been asked, “Who can we find to be in [KTown]? There’s not a big star who is Korean that we 
could put at the center of it”77 (Press 2019). The high-profiled Crazy Rich Asians has pooled 
together a mass of Asian talent which (in conjunction with the many Asian American stars not 
included) has made such questions unsustainable. Alongside other successful films like Hidden 
                                                     
or Asian American, especially in the “race is visible” cultural climate. It is not to make the limiting 
assumption that all “Asian American” content must include ethnically specific markers.  
76 A Wikipedia article reveals that the number of Asian-led American television shows from the 2010s 
alone is already more than the combined count from the 1950s to 2000s (“American Television Series with 
Asian Leads” 2019).  
77 The lack of Asian talent was the same argument used to justify Jonathan Pryce’s casting in Miss Saigon 
(Chapter 2). 
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Figures, Get Out, Girls Trip, and Black Panther, it proves that “culturally specific” 78 stories can 
appeal to wide audiences (Sun and Ford 2018). 
3. Mainstream Romantic Comedy Conventions 
Both Flower Drum Song and Crazy Rich Asians are mainstream romantic comedies79, and 
they recycle many of the tropes within this conventional format. For example, they both include 
a dressing room scene in which the main character tries on several different outfits before an 
event. In Flower Drum Song, Linda Low gets ready for her date with Wang Ta in the musical 
number, “I Enjoy Being a Girl” (Film Still 1a). She is duplicated in a three-way mirror to show off 
her outfit options, and the sexualized display is used to emphasize her pride in her looks and 
figure. In Crazy Rich Asians, Rachel picks out an outfit for Colin and Araminta’s wedding with the 
help of Oliver80 (Film Still 1b). This montage is full of Oliver and Peik Lin’s humorous one-liners 
(“This is why disco died”) and antics from Mr. Goh. It continues the movie’s voyeuristic show of 
wealth and high fashion, and in typical movie-makeover style, visibly transforms Rachel into 
someone who fits in with Nick’s upper-class world. This illusion is shattered soon after the 
wedding, when Eleanor reveals Rachel’s family history.        
                                                     
78  As a caveat, labelling these films as “culturally specific” to mean “made by marginalized groups” 
reinforces the hegemonic notion that the dominant culture is the norm. The phrase association assumes 
that films about dominant groups are universal and not culturally specific to them, and the reverse for 
marginalized groups. 
79 Other recent Asian American romantic comedies include shows like The Mindy Project (2012-2017), 
Selfie (2014), and Master of None (2015-present), and films like The Big Sick (2017), To All the Boys I’ve 
Loved Before (2018), and Always Be My Maybe (2019) (Christina Lee 2018). 
80 Oliver serves as the “gay best friend” figure, a common trope within romantic comedies. He is played 
by the openly gay Nico Santos. 
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a  b  
Film Still 1: Dressing Room Scenes (Koster 1961; Chu 2018) 
Film Studies professor Leger Grindon describes the differences between romantic 
comedies in the mainstream and margins with sets of opposing traits, reproduced in Table 5, 
below (Grindon 2012, 83).  
Table 5: Mainstream and Marginal Traits in the Hollywood Romantic Comedy 
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Flower Drum Song falls into the “mainstream” category for all twelve traits listed above. 
Though Crazy Rich Asians mostly follows suit, it diverges from the mainstream for items 7 and 10 
(women seeking economic security and delaying sex/embraces until the end of the film), which 
can be explained by the female-empowerment angle of Crazy Rich Asians. The writers and 
director have given Rachel the agency to decide whether to stay with Nick, and they turned the 
shallow Eleanor of the book into a respectable and self-sacrificing mother (Liao 2018). Unlike in 
Flower Drum Song’s era, which came before the second wave feminist movement, the idea that 
a woman can be economically independent and control her own sexuality has become 
mainstream.  
Glamorous leads are the first listed sign of a mainstream romantic comedy (Table 5). In 
the two films, this convention pairs with the good looks of the cast members to underscore the 
attractiveness of the male lead characters. In Flower Drum Song, Wang Ta is pursued by three 
different women, even kissing two of them onscreen—Linda Low and Mei Li—a rarity for 
Hollywood portrayals of Asian men at the time81 (Film Still 2a). In Crazy Rich Asians, there are 
several Asian men who are visibly loved and kissed by their partners, and whose shirtless, 
muscular bodies are put on display: Nick Young, Colin Khoo, and Michael Teo (Film Still 2b). The 
taken-for-granted handsomeness and congeniality of Wang Ta and Nick Young thus directly 
counter the stereotypes of the Asian man as emasculated, asexual, or threatening (Chapter 2). 
                                                     
81 Wang Ta does reiterate the stereotype of the sexually shy Asian male in his encounter with the more 
experienced Linda Low. When explaining how he is a mix of Chinese and American, he says, “Sometimes 
the American half shocks the Oriental half. Sometimes my Oriental half keeps me from showing a girl 
what’s on my mind” (Koster 1961). He only gains confidence when he kisses the even more naïve Mei Li.  
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This romantic comedy formula, in appealing to a wide range of audiences, moves these Asian 
males from the margins to the mainstream. 
a  b  
Film Still 2: Attractive Male Leads (Koster 1961; Chu 2018) 
The politics of these romantic comedies are not limited to their treatment of gender. 
Feminist critic Rowe suggests that romantic comedies tend to lean towards anti-authoritarianism 
and social transformation (Grindon 2012, 78). To identify the sources of authority and sites for 
social transformation within these two conventional films, one can look outside the films 
themselves. As discussed in Chapter 2, at the time of Flower Drum Song, anti-Asian immigration 
and naturalization restrictions were still in place. Coupled with Orientalized images in the media, 
Asians became the “other.” Asian Americans, for their part, became lumped in with Asian Asians, 
creating the perpetual foreigner myth. This myth continues to persist today, as discussed in 
Chapter 282.  
                                                     
82 As another example, in 2016, after China was mentioned several times during a presidential debate, Fox 
News sent Jesse Watters to New York’s Chinatown to survey the residents’ political opinions (Fox News 
2016). The purpose of the visit, the blatant stereotyping in the clip, and the interviews of non-English 
speakers are evidence of an underlying and continuously renewed belief that Chinese Americans are both 
foreign and connected to China. In addition, Bill O’Reilly’s comment post-clip that it “seemed like 
everybody was aware of what’s going on” emerges from the stereotype that Chinatown is an insulated 
community which is not invested in American politics (Fox News 2016). Ronny Chieng, in addition to 
playing Eddie Cheng in Crazy Rich Asians, is also a senior media correspondent on The Daily Show with 
Trevor Noah, and he criticized the clip a few days later (The Daily Show with Trevor Noah 2016). 
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By committing thoroughly to mainstream romantic comedy conventions then, these two 
films challenge the perpetual foreigner myth (anti-authoritarianism) and locate a place for Asian 
Americans within mainstream society (social transformation). As mentioned before, Flower Drum 
Song was created to entertain, not to make innovations to Broadway musical conventions. 
Similarly, Jon M. Chu has said that one of his goals in making Crazy Rich Asians was to show that 
“classic Hollywood movies could have starred Asians,” and he sticks to the formulaic romantic 
comedy patterns (Tseng-Putterman 2018). In making each film’s specific “Asian American story” 
legible to audiences, the creators have given up the chance to experiment with narratives and 
cinematic forms, or as Film Studies scholar Peter X Feng phrases it, comprehensibility comes at 
the cost of originality 83  (Feng 2017, 125–26). This conflict helps explain why the “minority 
viewpoints” of Fresh Off the Boat and Crazy Rich Asians are described with what are ostensibly 
contradictions: “specific but relatable” and “authentic but universal.” That is, political efficacy 
and identity politics require that these stories are racialized in a way that would be legible to the 
audiences they want to reach (Feng 2017, 126). This legibility can be attained through cinematic 
conventions.  
However, genres like the romantic comedy create ideological contradictions that are 
fundamentally irreconcilable, yet symbolically resolved through the narrative (Feng 2017, 125). 
In both Flower Drum Song and Crazy Rich Asians, the contradiction is found within the political 
assertion that Asian Americans are not perpetual foreigners. Such a claim can be proven through 
two options. Either Asian Americans are presented as the “same” as the hegemonic members of 
                                                     
83 Recall Chapter 1, which mentioned that genre conventions and stereotypes are both used in media to 
quickly convey information to audiences. 
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American society, or they are presented as “more American” than others. Without many non-
Asian characters in either film, both resort to the latter option. In effect, the “Other”—the “real 
foreigner”—then becomes increasingly Orientalized and foreignized by its comparison to the 
Asian American. In Flower Drum Song, these figures include Mei Li and the older generation of 
less-assimilated Asian Americans. In Crazy Rich Asians, Eleanor and Ah Ma (Shang Su Yi) most 
prominently play this role through the former’s assertion that Rachel is too American, and the 
latter’s place as the only main character who doesn’t speak English 84 . This ideological 
contradiction between wanting to subvert the perpetual foreigner stereotype and wielding it 
against another is overlaid with the mainstream romantic comedy narrative. The cultural conflict 
becomes both a barrier to romantic relationships, driving the narrative forward, and a means to 
foreignize the “Other.” Thus, when love overcomes those conflicts, it also symbolically resolves 
the contradictions. The next section will look more closely at how humor maps the ideological 
contradictions of resisting the perpetual foreigner stereotype onto language. 
4. Accents and Languages 
As noted in Chapter 2, generic and exaggerated “Asian” accents are frequently used to 
mark the “Asianness” of characters in American films and television. Classic examples include 
Mickey Rooney’s Mr. Yunioshi in Breakfast at Tiffany’s, Gedde Watanabe’s Long Duk Dong in 
Sixteen Candles, and Hank Azaria’s Apu Nahasapeemapetilon from The Simpsons (Nath 2018). 
With such caricatures, the fake accent itself is intended to be funny, marking the characters as 
Oriental and inferior (a case of derisive ethnic humor). These stereotyped accents are symptoms 
                                                     
84 In the novel, Shang Su Yi prefers to speak in Chinese and is fluent in Mandarin, Cantonese, Hokkien, and 
Teochew, but she is also fluent in English (Kwan 2013, 176). 
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of the perpetual foreigner myth, which also produces the related assumption that Asian 
Americans speak Asian languages.  
Accent and language-based mockery extends beyond the screen: Asian American 
journalist Helen Zia writes in her book, Asian American Dreams, that her childhood was filled with 
taunts composed of “a string of unintelligible gobbledygook that kids—and adults—would spew 
as they pretended to speak Chinese or some other Asian language,” as well as seemingly 
innocuous “compliments” that she speaks “such good English” (as if English were not her native 
language) (Zia 2000, 110). These images and experiences can create racial insecurities around 
linguistic abilities in the Asian diaspora of “Western” countries like America, Britain, and Canada85. 
As “Asian” accents and languages have frequently been used to foreignize and denigrate the 
Asian diaspora, it is unsurprising that both Flower Drum Song with its assimilationist narrative 
and Crazy Rich Asians with its desire to distinguish between the Asian diaspora and Asian Asians 
use humor to subvert the idea that all Asians have Asian accents and are familiar with Asian 
languages.  
As this analysis touches upon languages, dialects, and accents, the distinctions between 
these three terms must first be noted. A person typically cannot use one language (e.g. English, 
Greek, Hindi) to verbally communicate with a speaker of a different language (Yule [1985] 2010, 
                                                     
85  For example, Asian Americans and Canadians have articulated that witnessing these fake “Asian” 
accents can elicit feelings of shame, even if they themselves have “American” and “Canadian” accents 
(Yim 2017). One study shows that young British Asians change their speech patterns in career-related 
conversations to reduce the “foreign features” in their speech, a phenomenon more broadly known as 
“code-switching” (Zara 2010; Thompson 2013). This insecurity is not limited to Asian diaspora: Latin 
Americans also face accent-related racial injury. In the 1990s, accent-elimination classes rose in popularity 
for New York immigrants who faced employment discrimination because of their accents (Hernandez 
1993). 
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240–42). One language may have several dialects which vary in grammar, vocabulary, and 
pronunciation, but they are usually mutually understandable (Yule [1985] 2010, 240–42). For 
example, English can be divided into British English, American English, South African English, and 
so on, and each of these dialects may have further subsets of dialects as well. However, Chinese 
dialects are somewhat atypical because many are mutually unintelligible. Accents, unlike dialects, 
just refer to variations on pronunciation and may be linked to a speaker’s region, social class, and 
education (Yule [1985] 2010, 240–42). For example, radio producer and writer Stephanie Foo 
identifies “an uncle’s more bougie, British-educated Malaysian accent” in the film Crazy Rich 
Asians (Foo 2018).  
Flower Drum Song 
In Flower Drum Song the movie, when Mei Li and her father, Dr. Li, first arrive in San 
Francisco Chinatown after smuggling themselves in on a boat, Mei Li asks a man on the street for 
help finding Sammy Fong’s address, written on a piece of paper in what is presumably Chinese:   
Mei Li:  “Pardon me, venerable sir. Can you direct me to this address?” 
Man:  “Sorry, sister, I can’t read Chinese.”  
Mei Li: (To her father, surprised) “He does not understand.”  
 
Film Still 3: Mei Li asks a man for directions (Koster 1961) 
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After a song number (“A Hundred Million Miracles”), a crowd gathers around Mei Li and 
her father, drawing the attention of a policeman. Mei Li then asks the policeman for help finding 
the address, and a similar interaction follows: 
Mei Li:  “Please, we are looking for someone.” 
Policeman:  (Looks at the note) “I guess I should’ve taken lessons in Chinese.” (The 
crowd laughs.) “Anybody here read this?” 
Woman:  “I think I can. It’s the address of Sammy Fong. He’s at the Celestial 
Gardens.”  
 
Film Still 4: Mei Li asks a policeman for help (Koster 1961) 
These interactions set the tone for the rest of the movie. When Mei Li and Dr. Li walk 
through Chinatown, dressed in “Chinese” clothes and looking around curiously, they are 
immediately set apart from the rest of the inhabitants. These locals, all Asians in Western suits 
and dresses, stare as these two interlopers pass them on the street. The first man pictured in 
Film Still 3 (above) has an American accent which contrasts with Mei Li and Dr. Li’s “Chinese” 
accents86. The difference in the formality of their vernacular (Mei Li’s “venerable sir” and the 
                                                     
86 Miyoshi Umeki (Mei Li) was raised in Japan, and Kam Tong (Dr. Li) was raised in California, U.S.A. In the 
film, Umeki spoke in what recorded appearances suggest was her natural voice (though even in those she 
may have been performing). Her singing in the film does overemphasize an “Asian” accent when 
compared to her normal singing voice (VideosTimes2 2015). Tong’s accent was likely put on for the role.  
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man’s “sister”) further separates them. Both the man’s inability to read Chinese and his American 
accent are set up to be unexpected: the first speakers in the movie are two Chinese dockworkers 
who use Mandarin Chinese, followed next by the accented Mei Li and Dr. Li. Combining this 
pattern with historical representations, this man’s deviation from speaking either in Chinese or 
with a Chinese accent comes as a surprise. Mei Li’s assumption that the man can read Chinese 
also aids in this bit of misdirection. When Mei Li tries again in Film Still 4, both the policeman and 
the woman who help them also have American accents, and aside from the woman, the rest of 
the crowd apparently doesn’t read Chinese. Thus, the movie distinguishes between native-born/ 
assimilated87 Asian Americans and recent Asian immigrants based on accent, language ability, 
and dress88. 
The crowd’s laughter at the policeman’s comment, “I guess I should’ve taken lessons in 
Chinese,” signals that his dialogue is intended to be humorous. Because the policeman is noting 
his own inability to read Chinese, and the audience laughs along sympathetically, the humor can 
be categorized as empathetic. Based on Farber’s framework then, the internalized constraint [a], 
a feeling of others’ superiority, is supplanted by [b], the strong desire to belong. The A, or social 
norm, is the perpetual foreigner myth which assumes that these Chinatown residents would have 
the ability to read Chinese and, as already challenged in Film Still 3, that they would have Chinese 
accents. The B, then, is that neither of these assumptions prove true.  
                                                     
87 In the book, everyone in the Wang family is born in China and has only been in the United States for 
about five years. However, in the movie all the “younger generation” characters (except for Mei Li) are 
native-born Asian Americans.     
88 The extreme difference in accent and speech between the immigrant and native-born generations is 
also used in earlier depictions of Asian characters. Notably, Charlie Chan’s awkward English (as portrayed 
by a white actor) is completely at odds with his native-born children’s fluent English.   
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Several potential readings of this set up emerge. One highlights a sense of community for 
native-born Asian Americans who might not be familiar with their heritage languages. In this 
reading, two potential sources supply feelings of inferiority which fuel element [a]. First, there 
may be a sense of incompetency for not knowing a language that others in the community know, 
and second, there is the racial insecurity which stems from Hollywood misrepresentation, 
discussed earlier. That an authority figure and most of the crowd also can’t read Chinese, and 
that these characters are presented as highly assimilated Americans, provides momentary relief 
from this suppression. The policeman’s assertion that he would have needed lessons in order to 
read the note furthers the idea that Asian culture is as foreign to native-born Asian Americans as 
it is to white America (however simplistic this dichotomy is). However, as Farber mentions, the A 
must remain in place for the humor to work. Therefore, within the movie, Mei Li and Dr. Li 
continue to evoke the foreigner figures which provide the incongruity necessary for the 
humorous moment. The potential for this interpretation to be subversive thus falls short.  
In an alternative reading which further erodes the subversive potential of this bit, the 
humor absolves white America from its role in creating the perpetual foreigner myth. Mei Li, a 
newly arrived Chinese immigrant, is the one who mistakes the first man as someone who can 
read Chinese, displacing any shame at having made assumptions about the Chinatown residents 
onto her person. This degree of separation gives white audiences a license to laugh with the 
crowd, as they are not the butt of the joke. That Mei Li is a sympathetic character grants her 
forgiveness for this misstep89, which can easily be ascribed to her unfamiliarity with her American 
                                                     
89 This forgiveness might not have been so readily extended to a white person, if one had made the same 
mistake as Mei Li. Such a hypothetical scene could be interpreted as racially profiling the crowd, in which 
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surroundings. However, her mistake also legitimizes these assumptions in real life (“Even the 
Chinese don’t realize that Chinese Americans are American”). Furthermore, Mei Li and her father 
rely on someone in the crowd knowing how to read Chinese. The crowd is asked by an authority 
figure, the policeman, to perform their “Chinese-ness.” This demand is met by the woman, whose 
ability to read Chinese is first qualified by “I think.” Thus, the crowd’s assimilation is precariously 
negotiated: on the one hand, their laughter signals that they are too “American” to be literate in 
Chinese, but on the other hand, they must be able to read some Chinese for the story to proceed.  
In the book, a very different accent-riddled interaction occurs when May Li and Old Man 
Li come to San Francisco. Here are the circumstances which bring the two to San Francisco: for 
fifteen years, Old Man Li has worked as a cook in China for a retired army general, General White, 
but to escape the Communists, the three of them move to Los Angeles (C. Y. Lee [1957] 2002, 
133). Three months later, General White dies, and Old Man Li and May Li move to San Francisco 
to seek Mr. Poon’s help in setting up a restaurant (C. Y. Lee [1957] 2002, 133, 136). The two are 
from Peking, China (Beijing), and they speak Mandarin, though May Li is also able to speak some 
Cantonese (C. Y. Lee [1957] 2002, 133, 145). Their initial interactions with people in Chinatown 
have been in Cantonese (C. Y. Lee [1957] 2002, 138, 145). Therefore, when they arrive at Mr. 
Poon’s address, Old Man Li assumes that the residents also speak Cantonese: 
                                                     
case the crowd’s laughter could be read as ridiculing the white person’s ignorance. Instead, the movie 
avoids overt commentary on racial hierarchies, and white people only appear twice. The first time, a white 
thief robs Master Wang Chi-Yang, and the second time, there are white spectators who watch the 
performances in Sammy Fong’s Celestial Garden. Some scholars have interpreted the robbery as a 
punishment for Master Wang’s resistance to “modernizing” and symbolic of white America forcing 
minorities into assimilation (as a consequence of the robbery, Master Wang finally moves the money he’s 
been storing under his bed to the bank, as his ethnically-assimilated sister-in-law had been urging him to 
do) (Kim 2013, 16–19). This scene is taken almost directly from the original book (C. Y. Lee [1957] 2002, 
33–35).  
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After lunch the next day they went to Jackson Street to visit Mr. Poon. They rang 
the doorbell of the two-story house and a fat woman answered the door. “We have 
come to see Mr. Poon of Peking,” Old Man Li said politely in Cantonese with a 
heavy Mandarin accent.  
 
“There is no Mr. Poon in this house,” the fat woman said in Mandarin with a heavy 
Hunan accent (C. Y. Lee [1957] 2002, 146). 
Unlike in the movie, this passage does not exoticize these two newcomers to America. 
Instead, this little bit of nonsense humor90 reveals that Chinese immigrants do not all share one 
uniform spoken language. Instead, the specificity of the accents and dialects used in this 
interaction and throughout the book reveal the diversity of these immigrants and their difficulties 
in communicating with each other. Most of the communication challenges within the book are 
similarly made idiosyncratic to the people involved. Take, for example, the introductory 
description of Master Wang: 
Wang Chi-yang was one of those who could not live anywhere else in the United 
States but in San Francisco Chinatown. He was from central China, speaking only 
Hunan dialect, which neither a Northerner nor a Cantonese can understand. His 
working knowledge of the English language was limited to two words: “yes” and 
“no.” And he seldom used “no,” for when people talked to him in English or 
Cantonese, he didn’t want to antagonize them unnecessarily since he had no idea 
what they were talking about. For that reason, he wasn’t too popular in Chinatown; 
his “yes” had in fact antagonized many people. Once at a banquet, his Cantonese 
host claimed modestly that the food was poor and tasteless and begged his 
honorable guest’s pardon, a customary polite remark to be refuted by the guests, 
and Wang Chi-yang, ignorant of the Cantonese dialect, nodded his head and said 
“yes” twice (C. Y. Lee [1957] 2002, 3–4).    
                                                     
90 In nonsense humor, the [a] is the rule of rational expression and the [b] is the freedom from those 
constraints. Here, the A element corresponding with rational expression is the norm that communicating 
with other human beings requires a shared language. In addition, Old Man Li switches to Cantonese from 
his native Mandarin for the purpose of facilitating his communication, setting up the expectation that the 
other conversant will know Cantonese. The B is that the two are somehow able to transfer information 
despite language mismatches and accents, as well as the thwarted expectation that the woman speaks 
Cantonese.  
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The ironic discrepancy between Master Wang’s intentions and the outcomes of his 
decision to use “yes” is a direct result of his inability to understand Cantonese, not English. Thus, 
Master Wang’s language barriers are immediately tied to his personal characterization instead 
of his status as a Chinese immigrant. Even when English becomes the language in question, the 
failure in communication is caused by Master Wang’s individual quirks. His younger son, Wang 
San, usually speaks to his father in Chinese. The only time he uses English is when he is forced to 
recite his lessons in front of his father. Instead of reciting the requested geography and arithmetic 
material though, Wang San repeats the only thing he has successfully memorized: the American 
Declaration of Independence. He gets away with this deception in the presence of his father; 
however, his aunt Madam Tang has been taking citizenship classes and knows enough English 
that she could catch him cheating (C. Y. Lee [1957] 2002, 40–41). Therefore, Master Wang is 
unable to understand his son, not because he is a “foreigner,” but because of his own insistence 
that rote memorization is the only effective way to learn material.  
Despite her studies in English, Madam Tang is not fluent in the language, leading to other 
language-based humor. First, she misreads a joke in an English-language newspaper. The joke is 
that a Chinese café manager’s inability to understand English thwarts a bandit’s attempted 
stickup, and instead of stealing money, the frustrated bandit ends up paying 85 cents for his meal. 
She interprets the joke as a real crime, twisting the story such that the bandit steals 85 cents from 
the manager, but the rest of his money is safe because it is kept in the bank (C. Y. Lee [1957] 2002, 
12). In her citizenship classes too, she misstates that a privilege of being an American citizen is 
being able to find a “joke” in the government, accidentally replacing the intended word, “job” (C. 
Y. Lee [1957] 2002, 30).  
 94 
 
Although these humorous set ups do mock Madam Tang’s grasp of the English language, 
they serve a larger purpose than to point out her mistakes. The newspaper cutout itself is a 
derisive caricature of the Chinese immigrant’s English. However, in both the article and Madam 
Tang’s mirrored actions, the Chinese manager and Madam Tang wield their misunderstandings 
to their own advantage: the manager receives his payment, and Madam Tang has another 
argument for why Master Wang should store his money in the bank. The lack of English 
proficiency is thus able to empower the immigrant, reversing the assumption that it is an 
insurmountable barrier to American life91. Madam Tang’s second mistake, replacing the word 
“job” with “joke,” is unintentionally reflective: it juxtaposes the seriousness with which she takes 
her citizenship classes with the cavalier attitude that natural-born American citizens can afford 
to have towards their government and citizenship status. 
In addition, language mistakes are not unidirectional (where only English words are 
messed up). In the book, Wang Ta’s friend, Chang Ling-yu, marries a girl from Mexico who is 
learning Chinese and misspeaks just like Madam Tang. When Dolores wants to tell Chang she 
loves him, she incorrectly says, “Wo ai chi,” which roughly translates to “I am gluttonous” (C. Y. 
Lee [1957] 2002, 195). Thus, Lee reminds his audience that language mistakes are tied to the 
adoption of any language, supplanting the typical English language vs “foreigner” opposition.  
In the film, this variety of layered linguistic humor is lost. Perhaps to increase legibility, all 
the major characters in the Broadway musical and movie adaptation speak English. Therefore, 
the inter-dialect humor, Wang San’s lesson recitations, and Madam Tang’s newspaper 
                                                     
91 It is also not clear in the novel whether the Chinese manager and Madam Tang are unintentionally or 
purposefully misunderstanding their situations. 
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interpretation no longer make narrative sense. In their place are rudimentary misunderstandings 
of American slang and more word replacement errors. A representative example follows.  
Wang Ta:  “Did you sleep well, my father?”  
M. Wang:  “Yes. Thank you, my son.” 
Wang Ta:  “Good. I need some money.” 
M. Wang:  “Money. That is nothing unusual. How much this time?”  
Wang Ta:  “Twenty-five bucks.”  
M. Wang:  “Bucks?” 
M. Liang:  “Dollars.”  
(Wang San enters. More dialogue.) 
M. Wang:  “Now, what do you need those 25 dollars for?”  
Wang San:  “He probably got himself a new tomato.”  
M. Wang:  “Tomato? For 25 dollars you could fill this room with tomatoes.” 
(More dialogue. Wang Ta exits.) 
Wang San:  “So long, Pop. Don’t take any wooden chopsticks92.” 
M. Wang:  “You! You go right back and finish your breakfast.” (To Madame Liang) 
“What language is he using? I have a feeling he has been disrespectful, 
but I am not sure.”   
M. Liang:  “No, no, that is American-style slang.” 
M. Wang:  “And I suppose it’s American-style too, when a boy can do anything 
without his father’s consent.” 
M. Liang:  “Yes, but this is the USA. In my citizenship class, I have learned, ‘We, 
the people of the United States, are entitled to life, liberty, and the 
pursuit of happy times.’”   
 
 Film Still 5: Wang San uses American slang (Koster 1961) 
                                                     
92 An ethnically-marked modification of the American adage, “Don’t take any wooden nickels.”  
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Because Master Wang is unfamiliar with his sons’ vernacular (“bucks,” “tomatoes,” 
“wooden chopsticks”), Madame Liang acts as a mediator between him and his children. Robert 
G. Lee identifies her as the pro-ethnic assimilation character, an idea reinforced with the song 
“Chop Suey” which is performed after Madame Liang obtains her citizenship later in the film93  (R. 
G. Lee 1999, 178). Scholar Chang-Hee Kim adds that the African American racial identity of actress 
Juanita Hall (who plays Madame Liang) gives Madame Liang additional authority to teach the 
more “foreign” Asians how to assimilate (Kim 2013, 34). Ultimately, though, Madame Liang 
herself must continue to perform her “outsider” status, as revealed by her misquoting the 
Declaration of Independence (“the pursuit of happy times”).  
The trite linguistic fractures throughout the film emphasize a gap between the immigrant 
and native-born Chinese Americans. This gap exists on two dimensions. One is cultural: the 
difference between modern America and a traditional, Orientalized China, as highlighted by the 
visual contrast between Wang San’s baseball outfit and Master Wang’s silk shirt (Film Still 5). The 
other is generational, as promoted by the song, “The Other Generation,” which follows shortly 
after the above scene. The song is sung first by the adults and then by the children, each 
bemoaning their inability to get through to the other generation. Interestingly, it ignores the 
intersection between culture and generation, focusing only on generic generational differences94. 
The artificial division between culture and generation is further encouraged when Madame Liang 
sides with Master Wang in the song: she commiserates with him along the lines of their shared 
                                                     
93  As Lee discusses, the song celebrates the absorption of Chinese ethnic differences into America’s 
multicultural melting pot, ignoring the racialized history and roots of Chinese Americans to focus on the 
more easily managed cultural markers (R. G. Lee 1999, 175)  
94 For example, both sides sing, “How will we ever communicate without communication?” 
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generation, whereas in other circumstances she stands against him to advocate for adopting 
American ways.  
This divide has implications for potential readings of the humor in the scene. Master 
Wang’s tomato line and his query as to whether Wang San is being disrespectful could be 
interpreted using the superiority theory of humor, in that it puts down his English abilities and 
highlights his outsider status. However, because “The Other Generation” song almost exclusively 
attributes the slang’s illegibility to the generational gap (despite Madame Liang calling the slang 
“American-style”), the misattribution theory of humor may also apply. That is, the ability to read 
Master Wang as an out-of-touch adult allows audience members to laugh at or with him because 
they can attribute their laughter to the innocuous generational gap. Subconsciously, this 
attribution frees them to also laugh at the Orientalized depiction of Master Wang, an impulse 
they may be blocked from outwardly accepting because the exclusionist laughter at his 
unassimilable “foreigner” status runs counter to the Cold War liberalist rhetoric of ethnic 
assimilation.  
In summary, by comparing how the book and movie version of Flower Drum Song handle 
language, it becomes clear that the movie has homogenized the complex ways in which the 
book’s Chinatown characters communicate with each other. A stereotyped divide forms between 
the immigrant and native-born Chinese Americans. As English is the privileged language in the 
film, all linguistic errors and misunderstandings are unilaterally made by the Chinese immigrants 
(Madame Liang, Master Wang, Mei Li, and Dr. Li), with the exception of the native-born Chinese 
Americans’ inability to read Chinese (Film Still 3, Film Still 4). Yet even this inability is normalized 
by the laughing crowd’s alignment with the policeman, and the misunderstanding once again 
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becomes Mei Li’s. As a result, the native-born, hyper-assimilated Chinese Americans’ way of 
speaking emerges as “correct” in the movie95. Overall, the movie version of Flower Drum Song 
uses the accents and language of the  “modern” and “Americanized” native-born to partially 
subvert the perpetual foreigner myth and promote Chinese Americans as evidence of successful 
ethnic assimilation (contributing to the formation of the model minority myth, as argued by 
Robert G. Lee (R. G. Lee 1999, 172)). However, in doing so, it intensifies the foreignness of Chinese 
immigrants, and requires that these “outsiders” change their language and ways in order to 
become more American.   
Crazy Rich Asians 
When Peik Lin’s father, Wye Mun Goh, is first introduced, he speaks haltingly to Rachel in 
what the closed captions call a “thick accent.” After he and Rachel exchange a few pleasantries, 
Mr. Goh reveals that he instead has a “normal accent”: 
Mr. Goh: (In thick accent) “Uh, uh, uh, Rachel Chu, we are so, uh, grateful for 
all the help you have given my, uh, Peik Lin back in her uni days. I 
mean, without you, uh, she would be a hot mess.” 
Rachel: “Oh my god, no. Actually, if it wasn’t for her, I’d be a big mess. She 
was a huge help to me in college. It’s nice to meet you, Mr. Goh.” 
Mr. Goh: “Nice to meet you, too, Chu. Ku-ku. Ku-Chu. You. Poo-poo.” (Laughs.)  
(In normal accent) “No, I’m just kidding. I don’t have an accent. I’m 
just messing with you. No, no, I studied in the States, too. Yeah, Cal 
State Fullerton. I majored in Thought.” 
Rachel: (Unamused) “Mmm.” 
                                                     
95 As a caveat to this analysis, Wang San’s exaggerated overuse of “American slang” is recognized as 
nonstandard when Wang Ta tells Mei Li to avoid learning English from his little brother. 
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a   b  
c   d  
e   f   
Film Still 6: Wye Mun Goh’s fake accent (Chu 2018) 
Mr. Goh’s antics are apparently typical for his character, as none of his family members 
question his change in voice. Instead, Mrs. Goh giggles at her husband (Film Still 6d), and Peik Lin 
shakes her head in exasperation (Film Still 6e). Their signals and Mr. Goh’s “just kidding” 
comment create the comic context in which this joke can be analyzed. Using Farber’s framework, 
this scene can be interpreted as employing a mix of derisive and nonsense humor, where the 
internal state [a] is both a sense of other’s superiority and the normative use of language, and 
the [b] state is a personal need for superiority and freedom from the constraints of rational 
communication. The A and B elements shift throughout the miniature comedic plot.  
Initially, the A element is the standard of high language fluency that is established by 
every character in the film who precedes Mr. Goh’s appearance. Whether they are speaking in 
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English, Cantonese, Mandarin, French, Malay, or Hokkien, these characters are comfortable96 
with the languages they use, and many are multilingual97. They also have consistent and natural-
sounding accents which are regionally and personally distinctive, whether or not audience 
members have the context to “place” the accents. By contrast, pre-reveal-Mr. Goh’s hesitant, 
“uh”-studded speech and inconsistent, generic “accent” stand out. His discomfort with English 
counters the superior language skills of the rest of the characters. However, he stops short of 
fully developing into the typical B element (a derisive caricature of an accented Asian) because 
Rachel’s response rejects hearing his voice as humorous. She returns his dialogue with a smiling 
face and cheerful tone without altering her own speech patterns98 (Film Still 6a). Mr. Goh’s accent 
thus passes without comment and is briefly normalized.  
As his words devolve into nonsensical rhymes of Rachel’s last name (Film Still 6b), the 
comedic plot becomes suspended in anticipation. Though his rhymes could potentially be read 
as words in some unknown language, the audience is alerted to the approach of the incongruous 
                                                     
96 By “comfortable,” I mean confident and competent in the language. I do not mean “unaccented,” as 
that word lacks meaning in this film’s transnational context. 
97 Kwame Anthony Appiah summarizes the complex politics of language in Singapore (Appiah 2018). To 
stabilize its ethnically heterogenous society, the country institutionalized four racial categories after its 
1965 independence: Chinese, Malay, Indian, or Other. All citizens were to learn two languages in school. 
One was English, and the other was Mandarin, Malay, or Tamil, based on a citizen’s race. However, this 
attempt to recognize identities also oversimplified and rigidified ethnolinguistic realities. About half of the 
Indians were not Tamil, and Mandarin was not the heritage dialect of most of the Chinese Singaporeans 
(40% spoke Hokkien, the Min dialect, and only 2% spoke Mandarin). In 1979, the “Speak Mandarin” 
campaign prohibited non-Mandarin Chinese dialects in both broadcasts and schools, cutting many of the 
older inhabitants off from both society and their descendants (Appiah 2018; Johnson 2017). After the 
2015 death of Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew, the main driver behind these policies, there has been a 
revived interest in cultural roots and ancestral languages (Johnson 2017). In the Crazy Rich Asians movie, 
however, Mandarin remains privileged over Hokkien, Cantonese, Malay, and Singlish (Chou 2018). 
98 Sometimes people may acknowledge accents that differ from theirs by slowing down their speech 
(implying impaired communication) or by imitating the accent (sometimes mockingly).  
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B element by Rachel’s baffled face and Mrs. Goh’s snickers (Film Still 6c and Film Still 6d, 
respectively). In addition, other parts of the film use subtitles to translate important dialogue, 
and their absence in this scene indicates that Mr. Goh’s words are not meant to be understood. 
Once he reveals his farce, the comedic plot is resolved as a lame and out-of-touch “dad” joke that 
fails to amuse Peik Lin and Rachel (Film Still 6e and Film Still 6f).  
Mr. Goh’s pretense is a clear parody of the generic “ching-chong” Asian accent that so 
commonly plagues Asian representations in Hollywood. His act evokes two other ways in which 
Asians are commonly ridiculed: the use of “gobbledygook” as an approximation for Asian 
languages and the mockery of Asian names99. Another A-B pairing has therefore developed by 
the end of this scene. Mr. Goh’s broken English (previously the half-formed B element) has turned 
into the expected A. This A element can be viewed expansively as the ways in which accent, 
language, and names are used to jokingly denigrate Asians, drawing inspiration from outside the 
movie’s world and potentially evoking a sense of inferiority in viewers who have experienced 
language and accent-related shame (the internal state [a]). Then, the A is disrupted by the reveal 
of Mr. Goh’s natural, American accent (the new B element). The target of this humor becomes 
the caricature itself, elevating a personal sense of triumph and superiority (the internal state [b]) 
over the stereotyped representations. 
                                                     
99 The first type of mockery is described by Helen Zia, mentioned at the beginning of this section (Zia 2000, 
110). The second is evidenced by the fake crew names (e.g. “Captain Sum Ting Wong”) reported by KTVU 
after the crash of Asiana Airlines Flight 214 in 2013 (Trinidad 2013). 
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Director Jon M. Chu and Ken Jeong aimed to misdirect the audience with Mr. Goh’s accent 
so that viewers would either recognize the stereotype at play 100  or question their personal 
assumptions about how Asians speak (Nath 2018; Flint 2018). Despite their intentions, some 
interpretations of this humor suggest that it is not victimless. By once again making an Asian 
accent the butt of a joke (even if subversively), the humor can reinforce the idea that having an 
Asian accent is undesirable. Mr. Goh’s assertion that he “[doesn’t] have an accent” also privileges 
the American accent as the norm and marginalizes individuals with Asian accents, including his 
own wife (though her laughter licenses his joke). In the Singaporean context of the movie, this 
choice becomes especially meaningful. In the nation’s “Speak Good English Movement” (2000), 
linguist Ying Ying Tan identifies the institutionalization of the idea that Singaporeans do not speak 
English well, despite the fact that a majority of Singaporeans use English as their main language 
(Tan 2018). This national narrative has created linguistic insecurity in some young Singaporeans 
who have responded by adopting pseudo-foreign accents in an effort to conform to the “superior” 
standards of American or British English (Tan 2018). They are exposed to these other accents 
through the radio, internet, cable television, streaming services, and movies (Tan 2018).  
In his review article of the movie, Mark Tseng-Putterman goes so far as to interpret the 
fake-accent scene as symptomatic of the film’s respectability politics that aligns it with the 
dominant social values of mainstream America instead of challenging them (Tseng-Putterman 
2018). That is, the film reassures viewers that this Asian—rich, educated, and “unaccented”—is 
the acceptable kind instead of questioning the underlying notions of acceptability. His argument 
                                                     
100 Encouraging recognition of the stereotype is an especially effective strategy for audience members 
familiar with Ken Jeong’s natural voice or his earlier performances in The Hangover trilogy as the accented 
Leslie Chow. 
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raises significant points about the film in general, since respectability politics is one way in which 
the romantic comedy is used to mainstream Asian Americans. However, it doesn’t apply as well 
to Mr. Goh’s accent joke.  
Mr. Goh figures as a cringe-inducing but caring dad. In this role, he makes several 
humorous but uncomfortable faux pas. He comments on Rachel’s appearance, targets K-pop 
stars’ weights, and pushes for Rachel to wear an inappropriate dress he picked out. By the end 
of the film, she has had enough, and she pushes him away from her at the engagement party, 
somewhat jokingly. Mr. Goh, a Gatsby-like nouveau riche figure, is far from the “acceptable” 
Asian that Tseng-Putterman suggests, yet he is also not a villain. Instead, his redeeming qualities 
emerge when the heartbroken Rachel takes refuge in his home after she learns about her father. 
In her sensitive moments, his joking subsides, and he and the rest of the Goh family tenderly take 
care of her. In Mr. Goh, at least, the film’s goals to create whole human beings has been met.  
In the novel, there is no fake accent scene. Instead, much of the linguistic humor within 
the film is found in the footnotes. As mentioned before, the book was targeted towards North 
American audiences, and the footnotes are no exception. This directionality is exemplified by the 
many explanations of cultures, histories, and Malay, Hokkien, and Cantonese terms to readers 
presumably unfamiliar with them101. For example, Kwan uses British equivalencies to explain 
Malaysian honorific titles, revealing his assumption that British culture is more familiar than 
Malaysian to North American audiences (Kwan 2013, 22, 93). The linguistic humor, then, is 
primarily based on translating curse words from Malay/Hokkien/Cantonese into English, a clear 
                                                     
101 Kwan revealed that the footnotes were initially written to just be informative (Kwan 2018). However, 
his editor recommended that he make them more entertaining, and he rewrote them in the voice of Nick’s 
gossipy cousin, Oliver T’sien.  
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case of counter-restriction humor, which subverts the norms of using inoffensive language. 
However, he does not provide a similar translation when his character Oliver speaks in French 
(“Chez toi ou chez moi?”) (Kwan 2013, 202). Again, the underlying presumption is that his 
audience does not need help understanding European languages, but it does for Asian languages.  
Generally, the novel version of Crazy Rich Asians embraces its own touristic exoticization 
of Asia. Framed as a satire of the extreme elite of Singapore, it largely keeps the audience at an 
emotional arms-distance from its caricatured figures. Comparatively, the film version is more 
conscious to avoid stereotype and stigmatic representations. As a result, it has softened much of 
the satire in the novel and made its main characters more well-rounded and likeable. The director 
and cast members of the film version have even tried to use humor to engage with and dismantle 
stereotypes such as the “ching-chong” accent. However, these efforts are only partially successful 
and reveal that the film, like the novel, fundamentally privileges American audiences. 
5. Conclusion 
Both the 1961 Flower Drum Song and the 2018 Crazy Rich Asians romantic comedy 
adaptations seek to dismantle the perpetual foreigner myth, the former as a part of assimilation 
narratives and the latter as an assertion of Asian American identity. However, the outcomes of 
their efforts are different. In the Cold War period before the Asian American movement started 
and the term “model minority” was coined, it seems likely that Rodgers and Hammerstein would 
have been more concerned about avoiding stereotyping Asian Americans as threatening hordes 
than as assimilable minorities. The Flower Drum Song musical and film took the accents and 
languages of the characters in the novel and heightened them into divisive stereotypes between 
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the native-born Asian Americans and the immigrant Asian Americans. Thus, the native-born Asian 
Americans indeed became assimilated while the immigrant Asian Americans were foreignized.  
For Crazy Rich Asians, the Twitter movements against whitewashing and the push for 
diversity on broadcast, cable, and streaming networks have made cultural specificity an 
important platform for the film’s creators. Therefore, in adapting the book, the Crazy Rich Asians 
film removed stereotyping humor (such as Rachel’s comment that she doesn’t date Asian men) 
and added its own subversive social commentary on stereotypes through Mr. Goh’s accent joke. 
While the downsides of Mr. Goh’s joke by themselves are of minor concern102, the Americentric 
perspective of the film which it reveals helps create an understanding of how a film which touts 
diversity and authenticity can end up reinforcing other dehumanizing stereotypes.  
The example of the Gurkha guards who protect Shang Su Yi’s estate are indicative of the 
film creators’ blind spots towards characters of non-East Asian descent (apart from Nico Santos 
and Henry Golding). The single Gurkha guard mentioned in the book has perfect Queen’s English, 
smiles, and treats Rachel with politeness and friendliness (Kwan 2013, 157). The Gurkhas as a 
group are described with awe as “the deadliest soldiers in the world”103 (Kwan 2013, 157). In the 
movie, however, the two turbaned guards are treated as unreadable menaces, and they circle 
the car in the dark while ominous music plays in the background. When one speaks, it is 
indiscernibly into a walkie talkie, until he says, “Yah yah!” to let Peik Lin know she can drive 
through the gate. That the film creators would make this shift is odd in itself. Perhaps they were 
forecasting troubled times ahead for Rachel, or perhaps they were emphasizing the jungle-like 
                                                     
102 Most reviewers, if they were critical, focused instead on their difficulties with suspending their belief 
that Wye Mun Goh’s brief attendance at a U.S. university would erase his accent (Thiagarajan 2018). 
103 Granted, this statement is somewhat exoticizing.  
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surroundings to make the subsequent appearance of an immensely wealthy estate even more 
jarring. However, that no one in the cast or crew noticed and spoke up about the dehumanization 
of these brown bodies (or did and were ignored) is even stranger, especially since the cast had 
been involved as on-set cultural advisors and had advocated for other changes (such as 
Constance Wu, who was also in this scene). The same Orientalizing portrayals that many Asian 
American activists have been advocating against have thus reappeared in Crazy Rich Asians.  
The privileges of the majority figures and lack of intersectionality in this instance speak 
volumes about the importance of diversity of experience, not just census diversity, for drawing 
attention to issues which may otherwise be overlooked. This moment, in addition to the other 
criticisms launched against Crazy Rich Asians, brings up the question of how much should be 
asked of the creative talents who play a part in these Hollywood films. On the one hand, Crazy 
Rich Asians faced a heightened level of scrutiny compared to many other white-led romantic 
comedies. On the other, they themselves labeled the film as a movement for diversity. The idea 
that no one film can represent everyone, a common defense for Crazy Rich Asians, is certainly 
true. However, in the Gurkha soldiers’ case, it wasn’t a lack of representation that was the issue. 
It was that the soldiers were incomplete and stereotyped figures used for laughs—the very same 
situation that marginalized activists and watchdog groups have been protesting. Thus, when 
marginalized creatives use comedy to appeal to broad audiences, they may humanize through 
empathetic humor, challenge subordination through subversive humor, or reinforce problematic 
representations through derisive humor or the inherent contradictions in humor. As they slowly 
enter and merge with the mainstream, they can change dominant discourses and power 
structures, but they can also perpetuate them.
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